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1. Introduction and Motivation
Electoral control [BTT92, HHR07] refers to attempts to tamper with the outcome of elections by
adding/deleting/partitioning either the voters or the candidates. To protect elections against such control
attempts and other ways of manipulation (see, e.g., the surveys [FHH10, FP10]), much work has been done
recently to show that the attacker’s task can be computationally hard: Certain voting systems are resistant to
manipulation [FHH10, FP10, CSL07] or control [BTT92, HHR07, ER10, EPR11] in certain scenarios. How-
ever, most of this work is concerned with NP-hardness results, which is a worst-case measure of complexity
and leaves open the possibility that many elections can still be manipulated or controlled in a reasonable
amount of time.
To avoid this disadvantage, manipulation and control problems have also been tackled from different an-
gles. For example, from a theoretical perspective, Zuckerman et al. [ZPR09] proposed approximation al-
gorithms for NP-hard manipulation problems and Faliszewski et al. [FHHR11] showed that restricting to
single-peaked electorates may strip manipulation and control problems off their NP-hardness shields. From
an experimental perspective, in a series of papers Walsh et al. [Wal10, Wal09, DKNW10, DKNW11] (see
also [CT07]) studied various voting systems empirically, such as single transferable vote (STV), veto, and
Borda, and showed that they can often be manipulated effectively, even though their manipulation problems
are NP-hard. Such an experimental approach is sourly missing for NP-hard control problems to date.
This paper is the first attempt to tackle NP-hard control problems via an experimental analysis. Among
natural voting systems with efficient winner determination, the system currently known to display the broadest
resistance (NP-hardness) to control is fallback voting, proposed by Brams and Sanver [BS09] via combining
approval with Bucklin voting. Erde´lyi et al. [ER10, EPR11] showed that fallback voting is resistant to 20 out
of the 22 standard types of control and that Bucklin voting behaves almost as good. Shortly after these results
with all proofs were made public in a technical report dated March 11, 2011, [EFPR11], Menton [Men12]
reported analogous results for normalized range voting (the version of his technical report that establishes a
matching number of resistances is dated April 25, 2011).
We empirically investigate six voter control scenarios for Bucklin and fallback voting and two for plurality
voting. Furthermore we investigate twelve candidate control scenarios for all three voting systems1, i.e., while
Walsh et al. [Wal10, Wal09, DKNW10, DKNW11] focused on constructive manipulation problems only
(where the aim is to make a candidate win), we study both constructive and destructive control problems (the
latter aiming at preventing some candidate’s victory). When generating random elections in our experiments,
we consider two probability distributions: the Impartial Culture model (where votes are distributed uniformly
and are drawn independently) and the Two Mainstreams model, introduced here to model two mainstreams
in society by adapting the Polya Eggenberger urn model [Ber85].
After introducing the investigated voting systems and types of electoral controls in Section 2, we present
the experimental setting and implemented algorithms in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 summarizes some of our
findings and observations for particular control scenarios. We conclude by providing a brief discussion of the
main findings of our experiments in Section 6, which allow a more fine-grained analysis and comparison—
across various control scenarios, vote distribution models, and voting systems—than merely stating NP-
hardness for all these problems. A comprehensive presentation of all results can be found in the appendix.
1Note that there are overall eight voter control scenarios but we only analyze those where for the corresponding control problem
no deterministic polynomial-time algorithm is known. Furthermore we do not analyze two types of control by adding candidates,
namely the case where the number of candidates that can be added is not limited, so that we investigate 18 of the 22 known types of
electoral control.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Elections and Voting Systems
An election is a pair (C,V ) consisting of a finite candidate set C = {c1,c2, . . . ,cm} and a finite list of voters
V = (v1,v2, . . . ,vn) expressing their preferences over the candidates in C. How the votes are represented
depends on the voting system used. A voting system E determines how the voters’ ballots are cast and
who has won a given election (C,V ), where the set W ⊆ C of winners may be empty or have one or more
elements. We call an election with votes cast according to a voting system E an E election. Here we focus
on the systems Bucklin voting, fallback voting, and plurality voting.
Bucklin voting is a preference-based voting system named after James W. Bucklin [HH26]. “Preference-
based” means that the voters’ ballots are (strict) linear orders over all candidates in C. For example, if
C = {c1,c2,c3} and a vote v is given by c2 c1 c3, then this voter v strictly prefers c2 to c1 and c1 to c3.
Let (C,V ) be a given Bucklin election. The level i score of a candidate c ∈C (scorei(C,V )(c), for short) is
the number of voters in V ranking c among their top i positions. Letting the strict majority threshold of a
list V of votes be maj(V ) = b‖V‖/2c+ 1, the Bucklin score of c ∈ C is defined to be the smallest i such that
scorei(C,V )(c)≥maj(V ). Every candidate with the smallest Bucklin score (say `) and the highest level ` score
is a level ` Bucklin winner (BV winner, for short). Note that there always exists a Bucklin winner, level 1
Bucklin winners are always unique, but on levels `≥ 2 there can be more than one BV winner.
Fallback voting is a hybrid voting system introduced by Brams and Sanver [BS09]. It combines Bucklin
voting with approval voting [BF83]. In a fallback election, each voter determines those candidates he or she
approves of and provides a linear order of the approved candidates. So for C = {c1,c2,c3} a vote in a fallback
election could be of the form c3 c1 meaning that this voter approves of c1 and c3, strictly preferring c3 to c1,
and disapproves of c2.
Winners are determined as follows in fallback voting: Given a fallback election (C,V ), the notions of level
i score of a candidate c ∈C and level i fallback winner are defined analogously as in Bucklin voting. If there
is a level ` fallback winner with `≤ ‖C‖, then he or she is the fallback winner in (C,V ). Otherwise (i.e., if no
fallback winner exists in (C,V )), every candidate with a highest approval score (which is the number of voters
approving of this candidate) is a fallback winner in (C,V ). The second case can occur in fallback elections,
since the voters can prevent the candidates from gaining points, and so it is possible that no candidate reaches
or exceeds the strict majority threshold on any level.
Note that Bucklin elections can be seen as fallback elections where each voter approves of all candidates.
So Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting.
In plurality voting, the most preferred candidate in each vote gains one point, and the candidates with
the most points are the plurality winners. Note that there always exists at least one plurality winner. This
voting rule is preference-based as well, even though the ranking of the candidates after the top candidate is
irrelevant.
2.2. Electoral Control and Control Complexity
Electoral control is a way to tamper with the outcome of an election by changing the structure of the election
itself [BTT92, HHR07]. These structural changes include adding, deleting, and partitioning voters or candi-
dates. In the model of electoral control these changes are exerted by an external actor, the “chair,” having full
knowledge of the voters’ preferences. For a detailed discussion of why and where this assumption is appro-
priate when investigating control complexity, see [HHR07]. Bartholdi et al. [BTT92] introduced the notion
of constructive control where the chair’s goal is to make a distinguished candidate end up winning alone the
resulting election. The case where the chair’s control action aims at preventing a given candidate from being
a unique winner is called destructive control and has been introduced by Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR07].
To study the complexity of control in different scenarios, a decision problem is defined for each type of
electoral control.
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E -CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING VOTERS (E -CCDV)
Given: An E election (C,V ), a distinguished candidate c ∈C, and a positive integer k ≤ ‖V‖.
Question: Is there a subset V ′ ⊆V with ‖V ′‖ ≤ k such that c is the unique E winner of election (C,V −V ′)?
E -CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING VOTERS (E -CCAV)
Given: An E election (C,V ∪V ′), where V ∩V ′ = /0 and V is the list of registered voters and V ′ is the list
of unregistered voters, a distinguished candidate c ∈C, and a positive integer k ≤ ‖V ′‖.
Question: Is there a subset V ′′⊆V ′ with ‖V ′′‖≤ k such that c is the unique E winner of election (C,V ∪V ′′)?
Constructive control by partition of voters is modeled via a two-stage election, where in the first stage V is
partitioned into V1 and V2 and the winners (subject to the tie-handling rule used, see below) of subelections
(C,V1) and (C,V2) run against each other in the final stage, with respect to V . Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR07]
introduced the tie-handling rules “Ties Promote” (TP) in which all subelection winners participate in the
runoff, and “Ties Eliminate” (TE) in which only a unique winner from either subelection can move on to the
runoff (if there is more than one winner, none of them moves on).
E -CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY PARTITION OF VOTERS (E -CCPV)
Given: An E election (C,V ) and a distinguished candidate c ∈C.
Question: Is there a partition (V1,V2) of V such that c is the unique E winner of election (W1 ∪W2,V ),
where Wi, i∈ {1,2}, is the set of E winners of subelection (C,Vi) surviving the tie-handling rule?
Depending on the tie-handling rule used, we obtain the problems E -CCPV-TP and E -CCPV-TE. For the
destructive cases, we simply ask whether it is possible to prevent the distinguished candidate from being a
unique winner, yielding the destructive control problems E -DCDV, E -DCAVE -DCPV-TP, and E -DCPV-
TE. Each of the four problems just defined models “two-district gerrymandering.”
E -CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY DELETING CANDIDATES (E -CCDC)
Given: An E election (C,V ) and a distinguished candidate c ∈C.
Question: Does there exist a subset C′ ⊆ C such that ‖C′‖ ≤ k and c is the unique E winner of election
(C−C′,V )
E -CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING CANDIDATES (E -CCAC)
Given: An E election (C∪D,V ), C∩D = /0, a distinguished candidate c∈C, and a nonnegative integer k.
(C is the set of originally qualified candidates and D is the set of spoiler candidates that may be
added.)
Question: Does there exist a subset D′ ⊆ D such that ‖D′‖ ≤ k and c is the unique E winner of election
(C∪D′,V )?
E -CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY PARTITION OF CANDIDATES (E -CCPC)
Given: An E election (C,V ) and a distinguished candidate c ∈C.
Question: Is it possible to partition C into C1 and C2 such that c is the unique E winner of election (W1 ∪
C2,V ), where W1 is the set of E winners of subelection (C1,V )
E -CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY RUNOFF-PARTITION OF CANDIDATES (E -CCROPC)
Given: An E election (C,V ) and a distinguished candidate c ∈C.
Question: Is it possible to partition C into C1 and C2 such that c is the unique E winner of election (W1 ∪
W2,V ), where Wi, i ∈ {1,2}, is the set of E winners of subelection (Ci,V )?
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Fallback Voting Bucklin Voting Plurality Voting
Control by Constr. Destr. Constr. Destr. Constr. Destr.
Adding Candidates R R R R R R
Deleting Candidates R R R R R R
Partition of Candidates
TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R
Runoff-Partition of Candidates
TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: R
Adding Voters R V R V V V
Deleting Voters R V R V V V
Partition of Voters
TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: R TE: V TE: V
TP: R TP: R TP: R TP: S TP: R TP: R
Table 1: Known results on the control complexity of fallback, Bucklin, and plurality voting. Key: R means
resistance, V means vulnerability, and S means susceptibility.
Summing up, we now have defined twelve candidate control problems and thus a total of 20 control prob-
lems. Note that the classic standard control scenarios include a version of control by adding candidates where
the number of candidates that may be added is not bound by a constant given in the instance. With that we
have fourteen candidate control problems and 22 different types of control but we do not consider these two
cases in our experimental analysis.
Let C be a type of electoral control. Using the notions defined by Bartholdi et al. [BTT92] (see
also [HHR07]), we say a voting system E is immune to C if the chair never succeeds in exerting control
of type C. If E is not immune to C, it is susceptible to C. If E is susceptible to a control type C, we say it is
vulnerable to C if the corresponding decision problem is decidable in deterministic polynomial time, and we
say it is resistant to C if the corresponding decision problem is NP-hard.
2.3. Control Complexity in Bucklin, Fallback, and Plurality Voting
Plurality voting is one of the first voting systems for which the complexity of constructive control [BTT92]
and destructive control [HHR07] has been studied in the above scenarios. Control in fallback voting and
Bucklin voting has been previously studied by Erde´lyi et al. [ER10, EPR11] with respect to classical com-
plexity and also with respect to parameterized complexity [EF10]. In terms of NP-hardness, among natu-
ral systems with polynomial-time winner determination fallback voting has the most resistances to control
(namely, 20 out of the 22 standard control types) and Bucklin voting behaves similarly well—just one case
is open (Bucklin-DCPV-TP). Table 1 gives an overview of known complexity results for electoral control in
these three systems.
3. Experimental Setting
In this section we describe the experimental setting. As stated in Section 2.2, the instances of control
by adding and deleting both candidates and voters contain a parameter k bounding the number of candi-
dates/voters that can be deleted or added. In our experiments, we confine ourselves to the case of k = bn/3c,
where n is the number of voters. Since every yes-instance for a given k is also a yes-instance for k′ ≥ k, the
number of yes-instances found in our experiments are a lower bound for the number of yes-instances when
more voters can be deleted or added.
We randomly generated elections (C,V ) with m = ‖C‖ and n = ‖V‖ for all combinations of n,m ∈
{4,8,16,32,64,128}. Each combination of n and m is one data point for which we evaluated 500 of these
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elections, trying to determine for each given election whether or not control is possible. How the elections
have been generated and how the algorithms are designed will be described below.
Before we specify the different distribution models underlying our election generation, we explain how
random votes can be cast in Bucklin and fallback voting and how many different votes exist in both voting
systems.
Assuming that the generated election has m candidates, in Bucklin voting a random vote can be obtained
by generating a random permutation over the m different candidates. Clearly, the overall number of different
votes in Bucklin elections is m!.
In fallback voting random votes can be generated as follows: In a first step, a preference (i.e., linear order)
p over all m candidates is drawn randomly under a certain distribution (see below) from all m! possible
preferences. In a second step, the number of approved candidates, say `, is drawn from the possible numbers
{0,1,2, . . . ,m}. The preference p and ` are drawn independently. Then, the generated vote consists of the first
` candidates in p. Generalizing this, we know that there can be ∑m`=0
(m
`
)
l! different votes in fallback elections
with m candidates. With this in mind, we now specify the two distribution models we will be working with.
In the Impartial Culture model (IC model) we assume uniformly distributed votes and draw each vote
independently out of all possible preferences.
In the second model, which we call the Two Mainstreams model (TM model), we adapt the Polya Eggen-
berger urn model (PE model, see [Ber85]) that has been used by Walsh [Wal10] in the following way: We
draw two votes out of an urn containing all possible, say t, votes (with t = m! or t = ∑m`=0
(m
`
)
`!, depending
on the voting system). Each of these votes can be interpreted as a representative of one “main stream” in
society (e.g., liberal and conservative). Then each vote is put back into the urn with k additional votes of the
same form. Out of this urn the votes for the election are drawn randomly with replacement. So we have that
each voter’s preference is with probability 1/3 from the first mainstream, with probability 1/3 from the second
mainstream, and with probability 1/3 it is a different preference. The main difference to the above-mentioned
Polya Eggenberger urn model is that the voters do not influence each other. We do have correlated votes
in the sense that with a certain probability voters vote like other voters but there are no direct dependencies
between the voters, whereas in the PE model the preference of the first voter influences the preference of the
second voter, who in turn influences the preference of the third voter, and so on. Of course, an investigation of
control in elections generated in this model could be interesting as well but we postpone this to future work.
Note that for control by adding voters, a second list of votes has to be generated, namely the ballots of the
unregistered voters that may be added. In our setting, the list of unregistered voters is of the same size as the
list of registered voters and both lists are generated with the same underlying distribution model.
4. A High-Level Description of the Algorithms
All algorithms for the different types of control share the same essential method of testing various subsets,
and they differ only in the type of preordering and internal testing.
Before actually searching for a successful sublist of voters or subset of candidates, the algorithms check
conditions that would indicate that the given instance is a no-instance. If the tested conditions do not hold
the candidates or voters are preordered to ensure that the algorithm tries promising subsets or sublists first.
Depending on the control type at hand some of the following conditions are tested.
Condition 1: The distinguished candidate is positioned on the last place in every vote, or is positioned on
the last place or is disapproved by every voter if (C,V ) is a fallback election.
Condition 2: For each k′ ≤ k, determine the smallest i and j such that
scorei(C,V )(c
′)≥ b(‖V‖−k′)/2c+1+ k′ and score j
(C,V )(c)≥ b(‖V‖−k′)/2c+1
hold for c′ ∈C−{c}. It holds that i≤ j−1 for all k′ ≤ k.
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Condition 3: For each k′ ≤ k determine the smallest i and j such that
scorei(C,V )(c
′)≥ ⌊(‖V‖+ k′)/2⌋+1 and score j
(C,V )(c)≥
⌊
(‖V‖+ k′)/2⌋+1− k′
hold for c′ ∈C−{c}. It holds that i≤ j−1 for all k′ ≤ k.
Condition 4: In the given election, the winner has a strict majority on the first level.
Condition 1 is tested for every constructive control type except the partition of candidates cases (with and
without runoff).
In the following sections we will describe the different algorithms for the different types of electoral con-
trols and the implemented preorderings.
4.1. Algorithms for Voter Control
We begin with the algorihtms for the voter control cases. For both constructive control by adding and deleting
voters, Condition 1 is tested. Note that for the adding voter cases this condition has to hold for both voter
lists, the registered voters and the unregistered voters.
For constructive control by deleting voters, Condition 2 is additionally tested. If Condition 2 holds, c
cannot be made a unique winner by deleting at most k voters because even if all k voters would harm the
strongest rival c′ of c the most and c not at all, the rival would still reach a strict majority on a lower level
than c.
For constructive control by adding voters, Condition 1 and 3 are tested. If Condition 3 holds for the given
election and the given distinguished candidate c, then even if all added voters helped only c on the lowest
level, there would still be at least one other candidate reaching a strict majority on a level lower than c.
For the voter-partition cases, we have Condition 4 indicating that control is not possible for both the
constructive and destructive case, namely that in the given election there is a unique winner on the first level.
It is easy to see that for every possible partition (V1,V2) of V a level 1 winner is also a level 1 winner in
at least one of the subelections. Since level 1 winners are always unique, independent of the tie-handling
model, this candidate always participates in the runoff and will therefore always be the unique level 1 winner
of the resulting two-stage election. So no distinguished candidate can ever be made the unique winner by
partitioning the voters. So the algorithms for destructive and constructive control by partition of voters first
check Condition 4 where the latter checks Condition 1 as well.
After having excluded these trivial cases, the different algorithms search for a successful sublist of V after
having ordered the voters.
We will describe this procedure for constructive control by deleting voters where the voters are ordered
ascending for c. That is, after the preordering v1 is a voter positioning c worst and vn is a voter positioning
c best among all voters. In fallback voting, the “worst position” for a candidate is to be not approved at all.
The algorithm now starts with deleting those votes c benefits least of. It follows the procedure of a depth-first
search on a tree of height k that is structured as shown in Figure 1.
In each node, it is tested whether deleting the voters on the path is a successful control action. So on the
path s→ 1→ 2→ 3 the algorithm tests the sublists (v1),(v1,v2),(v1,v2,v3) and then tracks back testing the
sublists (v1,v2,v4),(v1,v2,v5),(v1,v3),(v1,v3,v4), and so on. The branches on the left side are visited first
and due to the preordering of the votes, these are the votes c benefits least of.
For the adding-voters case, the voters in the list of unregistered voters are ordered in a descending order for
the distinguished candidate and the algorithm proceeds similar to the algorithm for the deleting-voters case,
trying to find a successful sublist for the control. With this preordering, the algorithm first tests those voters
the distinguished candidate can benefit most from when these are added to the voter list.
For the partition cases the algorithm considers every possible sublist of the voter list up to size k = bn/2c
as V1, sets V2 =V −V1, and tests whether this is a successful control action or not. For the constructive cases
the voters are preordered descendingly with respect to the distinguished candidate whereas for the destructive
control cases no preordering is implemented.
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Figure 1: Tree for n = 5 voters where up to k = 3 voters may be deleted. A node i corresponds to voter vi
after the preordering.
4.2. Algorithms for Candidate Control
The algorithms for the candidate control scenarios test Condition 1 in the constructive cases except where the
candidates are partitioned. For the destructive cases, on the other hand, Condition 4 is always tested. Note
that for the adding candidates cases both conditions must hold in the election over both the registered and the
unregistered candidates.
After testing for trivial instances the algorithms make use of the same approach of testing systematically
preordered candidate subsets to find a successful control action. Here, the candidates are also ordered with
respect to the distinguished candidate, where a descending order means that the first candidate has the most
voters positioning him or her before the distinguished candidate and the last candidate has the fewest voters
doing that. An ascending order is defined analogously. Again, in the adding candidates case, the votes over
all candidates (including the unregistered) are considered.
The descending ordering is used for finding control actions for the constructive case of deleting candidates
and the destructive cases of adding and partitioning candidates with and without runoff. In the costructive case
of the deleting candidates scenario we want to make the distinguished candidate the winner, so the algorithm
tries to delete those candidates whose deletion moves the distinguished candidate forward in as many votes
as possible. On the contrary the algorithm for destructive control by adding candidates tries to prevent the
distinguished candidate from winning, so candidates are added that move the distinguished candidate back
in as many votes as possible. The algorithm for both destructive cases of partition of candidates assignes the
distinguished candidate to the subset C1 and tries to prevent him or her from moving to the final election. So
the other participants in C1 are chosen from the remaining candidates after having ordered them descending
with respect to the distinguished candidate.
With analog arguments it is obvious that an ascending order of the candidates with respect to the dis-
tinguished candidate is used for the destructive case of deleting candidates, the destructive case of adding
candidates, and the constructive case of partition of candidates. Note that the algorithm for constructive con-
trol by partition of candidates positions the distinguished candidate in C2 and assigns those other candidates
to C2 that are positioned behind the distinguished candidate in as many votes as possible since those are direct
rivals for the distinguished candidate in the final election.2
Obviously, in the worst-case, the algorithms check all possible subsets of size at most k, so they have a
worst-case running time of ∑k`=1
(n
`
)
. To handle the worst-case scenarios, a time limit of ten minutes has been
2Recall that the candidates in C2 participate directly in the final round whereas those candidates in C1 have to compete against each
other in a pre-round election.
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implemented such that the algorithms stop when exceeding this limit, indicating by the output that the search
process is aborted unsuccessfully. Setting the time limit higher can only increase the number of yes-instances,
so again, the results obtained in our experiments give a lower bound for the number of yes-instances in the
generated elections. In our experiments we implemented the same timeout value for all investigated types
of control. As our results in Section 5 will show, the different control types react differently to this constant
timeout threshold, so tuning of the timeout-parameter would be an interesting issue for further experiments.
Also, varying the timeout value with respect to the election size at hand might be an interesting approach.
The algorithms and data-generation programs are implemented in Octave 3.2 and the experiments were
run on a 2,67 GHz Core-I5 750 with 8GB RAM.
5. Summary of Experimental Results
Tables 2 and 3 summarize our experimental results on control in Bucklin, fallback, and plurality voting. We
investigated the three voting systems only for those control types they are not known to be vulnerable to,
which is indicated by an R- or an S-entry in Table 1. That is, destructive control by adding and by deleting
voters (DCAV and DCDV) are omitted in Tables 2 and 3. Also, since our algorithms use the parameter k
bounding the number of candidates to be added, constructive and destructive control by adding an unlimited
number of candidates (CCAUC and DCAUC) are not considered either. For each combination of any of the
remaining 18 control types, any of the two voting systems Bucklin and fallback voting, and any of the two
distribution models (IC and TM), we tested a total of 18,000 = 36 · 500 elections, varying over the 36 data
points with different values for m and n, as explained above. This gives a total of 1,296,000 = 18 ·4 ·18,000
generated and tested elections. For plurality voting we investigated fourteen types of electoral control leading
to 504,000 = 14 ·2 ·18,0000 generated and tested elections.
Tables 2 and 3 give an overview of the percentage of timeouts for each such combination of control
type/voting system/distribution model, and also the minimal and maximal percentage of yes-instances ob-
served. We do not discuss the results for all these cases in detail here. Rather, we will focus on adding/deleting
candidates/voters and partition of voters to very briefly discuss some observations from our experiments, to
exemplify some of the numbers in Tables 2 and 3. For those cases that we discuss in detail, we provide plots
giving the percentage of yes-instances, timeouts, and average computational costs for all different election
sizes that were tested. Note that a comprehensive presentation of all results containing the above information
for all cases can be found in the appendix.
Constructive Control by Deleting and by Adding Voters:
We here briefly discuss some results for control by deleting voters only, since those for control by adding
voters are very similar, in both Bucklin and fallback voting.
In the IC model, increasing the number of candidates decreases the number of yes-instances in the gen-
erated Bucklin elections as can be seen in Figure 2 showing the results for control by deleting voters for
Bucklin voting in the IC model. On the other hand, the number of yes-instances increases with the number
of voters growing. In the Two Mainstreams model, the same correlations can be observed but here, again, the
total number and percentage of yes-instances is smaller than in the IC model.
Fallback voting behaves very similarly, so for both distributions and both voting systems increasing the
number of candidates makes successful actions of control by deleting voters less likely.
In both voting systems and in both distribution models, timeouts occur whenever the number of voters
exceeds 32. If the number of candidates is 128, we have timeouts already with 16 voters. This can also be
seen in the development of the computational costs shown in Figure 2c after the peak for n = 16. For bigger
electorates the average computational costs drop since the number of timeouts increases with the number of
no-instances diminishing.
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Fallback Voting Bucklin Voting
min max to min max to
IC TM IC TM IC TM IC TM IC TM IC TM
CCAC 1 0 11 7 51 50 0 0 23 11 50 49
DCAC 53 39 92 71 11 14 71 42 99 77 6 12
CCDC 13 15 33 36 37 37 13 17 58 45 34 37
DCDC 8 12 78 63 15 22 48 25 99 77 7 18
CCPC-TE 0 0 19 18 62 64 1 0 57 37 57 62
DCPC-TE 8 16 88 65 18 29 49 29 100 78 10 23
CCPC-TP 1 0 17 17 62 64 1 0 60 38 57 61
DCPC-TP 8 16 87 61 18 29 49 29 100 82 9 23
CCROPC-TE 1 1 18 14 62 63 1 0 60 45 57 62
DCROPC-TE 8 16 86 68 20 29 46 29 100 84 9 23
CCROPC-TP 1 0 19 14 62 63 1 1 56 25 53 61
DCROPC-TP 8 16 85 68 21 29 45 27 100 81 10 23
CCAV 4 1 99 41 13 13 2 1 99 41 11 6
CCDV 2 1 97 39 16 12 2 1 100 42 11 7
CCPV-TE 2 0 97 34 9 45 2 0 98 32 8 44
DCPV-TE 50 34 100 88 4 16 64 40 100 89 4 10
CCPV-TP 1 1 53 20 40 50 1 0 72 23 31 48
DCPV-TP 37 27 100 87 6 17 60 39 100 88 3 10
Table 2: Overview of experimental results on control in Bucklin and fallback voting. Key: The “min” and “max” columns
give the minimal and maximal percentage of yes-instances observed in all tested instances for the given control
type, including those elections where timeouts occured; “to” gives the percentage of timeouts that occurred for
the total of 18,000 elections tested in this control case.
Plurality Voting
min max to
IC TM IC TM IC TM
CCAC 0 0 20 3 50 34
DCAC 70 47 99 60 7 25
CCDC 5 22 66 40 37 35
DCDC 8 12 78 63 15 22
CCPC-TE 0 0 60 21 58 65
DCPC-TE 1 2 100 59 22 41
CCPC-TP 0 0 64 24 58 65
DCPC-TP 1 3 100 59 22 44
CCRPC-TE 0 0 65 19 50 63
DCRPC-TE 25 14 100 61 12 37
CCRPC-TP 0 0 65 21 50 61
DCRPC-TP 23 14 100 61 13 35
CCPV-TP 0 0 54 13 24 23
DCPV-TP 55 15 100 59 4 35
Table 3: Overview of experimental results on control in plurality voting. Key: The “min” and “max” columns give the
minimal and maximal percentage of yes-instances observed in all tested instances for the given control type,
including those elections where timeouts occurred; “to” gives the percentage of timeouts that occurred for the
total of 18,000 elections tested in this control case.
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(a) Percentage of yes-instances.
m\n 4 8 16 32 64 128
4 0 0 0 10 3 1
8 0 0 0 20 7 0
16 0 0 0 23 19 13
32 0 0 0 39 27 4
64 0 0 1 49 38 17
128 0 0 31 53 47 17
(b) Percentage of timeouts.
(c) Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output, instances where timeouts
occur are excluded.
Figure 2: Bucklin voting in the IC model for CCDV.
Control By Partition of Voters:
As mentioned in Section 2, control by partition of voters comes in four problem variants, where each case
must be investigated separately.
For constructive control by partition of voters in model TP we made the following observations: Similarly
to control by deleting or by adding voters, the number of controllable elections increases with the number
of voters increasing. This was observed for all three voting systems investigated. We have seen that in at
most 13% of the tested plurality elections in the TM model a successful control action can be found. Note
that no timeouts occur for up to 32 candidates, so more than 87% of the elections tested are demonstrably
not controllable in these cases. For both distribution models, plurality elections produce fewer timeouts than
the corresponding fallback or Bucklin elections. This suggests that the control problem for plurality voting
is easier to solve on average than for fallback or Bucklin voting. Using the tie-handling model TE instead
of TP, in both Bucklin and fallback voting an increase of yes-instances in the constructive cases is evident.
By contrast, in the destructive counterparts no significant difference can be observed with respect to the
tie-handling rule used.
The most striking results are those obtained for the destructive cases. Here we have that, for all three voting
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systems (and both tie-handling models for fallback and Bucklin voting) in the TM model, the average number
of controllable elections is very high; and in the IC model, control is almost always possible, see Figure 3.
(a) Percentage of yes-instances.
m\n 4 8 16 32 64 128
4 0 0 0 18 40 61
8 0 0 0 3 15 29
16 0 0 0 1 5 15
32 0 0 0 0 3 9
64 0 0 0 0 1 5
128 0 0 0 0 0 1
(b) Percentage of timeouts.
(c) Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output, instances where timeouts
occur are excluded.
Figure 3: Fallback voting in the IC model for DCPV-TP.
In light of the fact that for these cases the resistance proofs of Erde´lyi et al. [ER10, EPR11] for fallback
and Bucklin voting tend to be the most involved ones (yielding the most complex instances for showing NP-
hardness), these results might be surprising at first glance. However, one explanation for the observed results
can be found in exactly this fact: The elections constructed in these reductions have a very complex structure
which seems to be unlikely to occur in randomly generated elections (at least in elections generated under the
distribution models discussed in this paper). Another explanation is that the problems used to reduce from
in [ER10, EPR11] tend to be easy to solve for small input sizes, but due to the complexity of the reduction,
the resulting elections have many voters/candidates compared to the elections generated for the conducted
experiments.
In the destructive cases, the number of timeouts is for all three voting systems the lowest among all con-
trol types investigated. In Bucklin elections with uniformly distributed votes and for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TP, for only 3.32% of the elections no decision can be made within the time
limit. As can be seen in the table, timeouts begin to occur for those elections where the number of voters
exceeds 16. But, again, we have to emphasize that these values are very low compared to other types of con-
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trol. This explains the plateaus all graphs show. On the one hand, increasing the number of voters increases
the number of yes-instances. But on the other hand, for more than 16 voters timeouts begin to diminish the
fraction of observed yes-instances. Also, the average running time of the algorithm for those instances where
the time limit is not exceeded is rather low, compared to other types of control, see Figure 3c. The highest
computational costs occur for those election sizes where the most no-instances were observed. As expected,
in the corresponding constructive cases the number of timeouts is significantly higher and so are the average
computational costs.
Control By Adding Candidates:
(a) Percentage of yes-instances.
n\m 4 8 16 32 64 128
4 0 0 0 83 81 81
8 0 0 0 93 92 93
16 0 0 0 98 99 98
32 0 0 0 99 99 100
64 0 0 0 99 100 100
128 0 97 98 100 100 100
(b) Percentage of timeouts.
(c) Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output, instances where timeouts
occur are excluded.
Figure 4: Fallback voting in the TM model for CCAC.
So far, the results for constructive control by adding candidates show the highest number of timeouts.
For those election sizes where no timeouts occur (i.e., where the determination of yes- or no-instances is
successful), we have that not many elections can be controlled successfully in either of the two voting systems.
In Figure 4, we see the results for fallback voting in the TM model, exemplifying in Figure 4a the low number
of yes-instances for this type of control. For example, in the “max” column in Table 2, the highest percentage
of controllable fallback elections is 11% in the IC model and only 7% in the TM model. Plurality voting
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shows similar results as fallback voting with at most 20% yes-instances in the IC model and less than 4% in
the TM model.
Figure 4b gives the detailed occurrence of timeouts for the different election sizes and Figure 4c shows the
average time needed to determine whether a given fallback election generated under the TM model can be
controlled by adding candidates or not. Remember that in the latter figure the average values do not consider
those elections where the algorithm exceeded the time limit of 600 seconds. Together with the timeout table
we can see in Figure 4a that in elections with up to 16 candidates the number of non-controllable elections is
very high and increases with the number of candidates increasing. When more than 16 candidates participate
in an election the number of no-instances diminishes as drastically as the timeout rate grows. Looking at the
computational costs in Figure 4c we can see this in the peaks for m = 16. Since by design our algorithm
needs generally more time to determine that an instance is a no-instance than finding a yes-instance, the high
number of no-instances for 16 candidates inflates the average computing time. Knowing that the average
computing time for finding yes-instances is not particularly high for this type of control (see Figure 12 in
the appendix) we might conjecture that for the bigger election sizes the instances where no distinction could
be made by our algorithm are no-instances rather than yes-instances. This indicates that this control type
presumably has the lowest overall number of yes-instances. Thus, even for small election sizes, this type of
control seems to be hard to exert succesfully.
Turning now to the destructive variant of control by adding candidates, for Bucklin elections generated
with the IC model, 71% is a lower bound for the number of controllable elections. For up to 16 candidates,
a successful control action can be found in nearly all elections. The results for the TM model reconfirm the
observation made before, namely that the tendencies in both models are similar, but with at most 77% and
at least 42% of controllable elections the overall numbers are again lower than in the IC model. The latter
results hold for fallback elections generated in the TM model as well, whereas in the IC model at least 53%
and no more than 92% of the fallback elections are controllable. In the tested plurality elections generated
with the IC model, similarly to Bucklin voting, more than 70% and nearly up to 100% are controllable. In
the TM model, roughly between 50% and 60% of yes-instances are found for those election sizes where no
timeouts occur, so between 40% and 50% of these plurality elections are not controllable. In this control
scenario, for about 46% of the elections no definite output is given in the constructive case, whereas in only
about 8% of the elections timeouts occur in the destructive case.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
We have empirically studied the complexity of NP-hard control problems for plurality, fallback, and Bucklin
voting in the most important of the common control scenarios. This is the first such study for control problems
in voting and complements the corresponding results [Wal10, Wal09, DKNW10, DKNW11, NWX11, CT07]
for manipulating elections. In general, our findings indicate that control can often be exerted effectively
in practice, despite the NP-hardness of the corresponding problems. Our experiments also allow a more
fine-grained analysis and comparison—across various control scenarios, vote distribution models, and voting
systems—than merely stating NP-hardness for all these problems. Tables 2 and 3 give an overview of our
experimental results. A detailed analysis and discussion follows here, and a comprehensive presentation of
all experimental data and results can be found in the appendix.
IC versus TM:
Comparing the results for the different distribution models, we see that in every voting system for all control
types studied (except fallback voting in constructive control by deleting candidates) the overall number of
yes-instances is higher in the IC than in the TM model. This may result from the fact that in elections with
uniformly distributed votes, all candidates are likely to be approximately equally preferred by the voters. So
both constructive and destructive control actions are easier to find. This also explains the observation that the
IC model mostly produces fewer timeouts.
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Constructive versus Destructive Control:
For all investigated types of control where both constructive and destructive control was investigated, we
found that the destructive control types are experimentally much easier than their constructive counterparts,
culminating in almost 100% of controllable elections for certain control types in the IC model. These findings
confirm—and strengthen—the theoretical insight of Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR07] that the destructive con-
trol problems disjunctively truth-table-reduce to their constructive counterparts and thus are never harder to
solve, up to a polynomial factor (see also the corresponding observation of Conitzer et al. [CSL07] regarding
manipulation): In fact, destructive control tends to be even much easier than constructive control.
Comparison Across Voting Systems:
For constructive control, we have seen that fallback and Bucklin voting show similar tendencies and numbers
of yes-instances, especially regarding voter control. We also observed that their constructive voter control
problems are in general harder to solve than those for plurality voting. In all three voting systems, constructive
control by adding candidates seems to be one of the hardest control problems showing the smallest numbers
of yes-instances in the TM model. Only for the constructive partition-of-candidates cases higher numbers of
timeouts were observed.
Adding Candidates versus Deleting Candidates:
Comparing control by adding candidates to control by deleting candidates in the constructive case we ob-
served that the number of yes-instances for control by deleting candidates is significantly higher. These
findings are perhaps not overly surprising, since in the voting systems considered here adding candidates to
an election can only worsen the position of the designated candidate in the votes. That is, constructive control
can be exerted successfully only if by adding candidates rivals of the designated candidate lose enough points
so as to get defeated by him or her. This, in turn, can happen only if the designated candidate was already a
highly preferred candidate in the original election.
Voter Control versus Candidate Control:
For fallback and Bucklin voting, we can also compare constructive candidate and voter control directly. In
both voting systems and both distribution models, the number of yes-instances for constructive control by
adding voters is around four times higher than the number of yes-instances in the corresponding candidate
control type, which confirms the argument above, saying that adding candidates cannot push the designated
candidate directly. Constructive control by deleting voters can be successfully exerted more frequently when
votes are less correlated, whereas the proportion of successful control actions for deleting candidates is about
the same for both considered distribution models. The observed differences between these types of voter
and candidate control may result from the fact that adding or deleting candidates only shifts the position of
the designated candidate, which may not influence the outcome of the election as directly as increasing or
decreasing the candidates’ scores by adding or deleting voters does. This explains why voter control can be
tackled more easily than candidate control by greedy approaches such as ours.
Concluding Remarks:
Just as Walsh [Wal09, Wal10] observes for manipulation in the veto rule and in STV, for all types of control
investigated in our experiments, the curves do not show the typical phase transition known for “really hard”
computational problems such as the satisfiability problem (see [GW95, CKT91] for a detailed discussion of
this issue).
These observations raise the question of how other distribution models influence the outcome of such
experiments. Furthermore, the algorithms implemented could be improved in terms of considering a higher
18
number of elections per data point, increasing the election sizes, or allowing a higher number of voters or
candidates to be deleted or added in the corresponding control scenarios. Besides this, other voting systems
can be analyzed since only their winner determination has to be implemented in addition to a few minor
adjustments such as trivial-case checks for the investigated control scenarios tailored to the voting system at
hand.
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A. Fallback Voting
A.1. Constructive Control by Adding Candidates
Figure 5: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 13 15 270 26 22 20 16 31 29 35 33 34
# ci 487 485 473 474 478 480 484 469 471 465 467 466
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 16 27 51 52 40 40 11 20 15 13 17 17
# ci 484 473 449 448 460 0 36 3 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 460 453 477 485 487 483 483
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 6 5 5 6 3 4 2 1 3 1 3 1
# ci 28 0 0 0 0 0 26 3 0 0 0 0
# to 466 495 495 494 497 496 472 497 497 499 497 499
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Figure 6: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 13 16 16 11 6 2 15 31 27 20 5 1
# ci 487 484 484 36 28 26 485 469 473 3 0 3
# to 0 0 0 453 466 472 0 0 0 477 495 496
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 27 29 51 15 5 3 26 35 52 13 6 1
# ci 473 471 449 0 0 0 474 465 448 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 485 495 497 0 0 0 487 494 499
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 22 33 40 17 3 3 20 34 40 17 4 1
# ci 478 467 460 0 0 0 480 466 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 483 497 497 0 0 460 483 496 499
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Figure 7: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 14 12 17 21 31 25 9 19 13 25 27 23
# ci 486 488 483 479 469 475 491 481 487 475 473 477
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 11 17 21 9 13 17 5 9 5 6 7 8
# ci 489 483 479 491 487 0 82 26 6 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 483 413 465 489 494 493 492
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 1 5 1 4 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0
# ci 92 33 5 0 0 0 95 36 10 0 0 0
# to 407 462 494 496 500 499 404 464 488 500 500 500
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Figure 8: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 14 9 11 5 1 1 12 19 17 9 5 0
# ci 486 491 489 82 92 95 488 481 483 26 33 36
# to 0 0 0 413 407 404 0 0 0 465 462 464
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 17 13 21 5 1 2 21 25 9 6 4 0
# ci 483 487 479 6 5 10 479 475 491 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 489 494 488 0 0 0 494 496 500
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 31 27 13 7 0 0 25 23 17 8 1 0
# ci 469 473 487 0 0 0 475 477 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 493 500 500 0 0 483 492 499 500
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A.1.1. Computation Costs
Figure 9: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding candidates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 194,7 seconds.
Figure 10: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding can-
didates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 459,54 seconds.
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Figure 11: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
candidates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 425,43 seconds.
Figure 12: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding candidates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 159,22 seconds.
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Figure 13: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding can-
didates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 451,05 seconds.
Figure 14: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
candidates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 439,68 seconds.
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A.2. Destructive Control by Adding Candidates
Figure 15: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 266 302 309 301 304 299 335 363 375 389 404 368
# ci 234 198 191 199 196 201 165 137 125 111 96 132
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 356 418 433 456 452 459 372 414 418 434 442 423
# ci 144 82 67 44 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 41 128 86 82 66 58 77
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 376 373 394 383 403 388 362 373 361 367 375 376
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 124 127 106 117 97 112 138 127 139 133 125 124
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Figure 16: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 266 335 356 372 376 362 302 363 418 414 373 373
# ci 234 165 144 0 0 0 198 137 82 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 128 124 138 0 0 0 86 127 127
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 309 375 433 418 394 361 301 389 456 434 383 367
# ci 191 125 67 0 0 0 199 111 44 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 82 106 139 0 0 0 66 117 133
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 304 404 452 442 403 375 299 368 459 423 388 376
# ci 196 96 48 0 0 0 201 132 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 58 97 125 0 0 41 77 112 124
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Figure 17: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 194 211 261 254 276 266 212 257 296 315 305 319
# ci 306 289 239 246 224 234 288 243 204 185 195 181
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 266 290 323 352 352 355 255 296 304 329 348 350
# ci 234 210 177 148 148 13 123 99 62 27 5 7
# to 0 0 0 0 0 132 122 105 134 144 147 143
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 272 280 322 334 342 335 267 284 338 353 337 336
# ci 118 108 58 19 4 6 135 105 58 20 6 0
# to 110 112 120 147 154 159 98 111 104 127 157 164
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Figure 18: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 194 212 266 255 272 267 211 257 290 296 280 284
# ci 306 288 234 123 118 135 289 243 210 99 108 105
# to 0 0 0 122 110 98 0 0 0 105 112 111
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 261 296 323 304 322 338 254 315 352 329 334 353
# ci 239 204 177 62 58 58 246 185 148 27 19 20
# to 0 0 0 134 120 104 0 0 0 144 147 127
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 276 305 352 348 342 337 266 319 355 350 335 336
# ci 224 195 148 5 4 6 234 181 13 7 6 0
# to 0 0 0 147 154 157 0 0 132 143 159 164
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A.2.1. Computational Costs
Figure 19: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
adding candidates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 18,53 seconds.
Figure 20: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by adding can-
didates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 453,8 seconds.
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Figure 21: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by adding can-
didates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 46,48 seconds.
Figure 22: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
adding candidates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 11,33 seconds.
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Figure 23: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by adding can-
didates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 366,67 seconds.
Figure 24: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by adding can-
didates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 113,63 seconds.
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A.3. Constructive Control by Deleting Candidates
Figure 25: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 115 129 131 140 153 159 98 103 154 114 121 146
# ci 385 371 369 360 347 341 402 397 346 386 379 354
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 106 133 158 167 166 152 109 129 144 123 139 148
# ci 394 367 342 333 334 348 33 2 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 358 369 356 377 361 352
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 86 85 99 103 110 90 71 76 78 63 74 63
# ci 29 1 0 0 0 0 0 28 30 23 0 0
# to 385 414 401 397 390 410 429 396 392 414 426 437
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Figure 26: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 115 98 106 109 86 71 129 103 133 129 85 76
# ci 385 402 394 33 29 0 371 397 367 2 1 28
# to 0 0 0 358 385 429 0 0 0 369 414 396
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 131 154 158 144 99 78 140 114 167 123 103 63
# ci 369 346 342 0 0 30 360 386 333 0 0 23
# to 0 0 0 356 401 392 0 0 0 377 397 414
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 153 121 166 139 110 74 159 146 152 148 90 63
# ci 347 379 334 0 0 0 341 354 348 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 361 390 426 0 0 0 352 410 437
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Figure 27: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 116 138 162 145 161 176 104 132 134 134 153 140
# ci 384 362 338 355 339 324 396 368 366 347 347 360
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 137 146 166 180 169 174 119 137 153 137 130 140
# ci 363 354 334 320 331 326 66 29 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 315 334 347 363 370 360
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 106 96 124 102 105 109 82 106 86 77 91 89
# ci 76 33 10 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 0 0
# to 318 371 366 398 395 391 341 394 414 423 409 411
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Figure 28: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 116 104 137 119 106 82 138 121 146 137 96 106
# ci 384 396 363 66 76 77 362 379 354 29 33 0
# to 0 0 0 315 318 341 0 0 0 334 371 394
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 162 132 166 153 124 86 145 134 180 137 102 77
# ci 338 368 334 0 0 0 355 366 320 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 347 366 414 0 0 0 363 398 423
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 161 153 169 130 105 91 176 140 174 140 109 89
# ci 339 347 331 0 0 0 324 360 326 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 370 395 409 0 0 0 360 391 411
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A.3.1. Computation Costs
Figure 29: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting candidates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 64,05 seconds.
Figure 30: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
candidates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 356,18 seconds.
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Figure 31: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
candidates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 250,39 seconds.
Figure 32: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting candidates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 49,05 seconds.
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Figure 33: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
candidates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 347,06 seconds.
Figure 34: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
candidates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 227,76 seconds.
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A.4. Destructive Control by Deleting Candidates
Figure 35: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 84 97 107 75 68 39 181 228 257 248 250 247
# ci 416 403 393 425 432 461 319 272 243 252 250 253
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 303 387 389 99 411 401 336 364 415 406 433 406
# ci 197 113 111 99 89 99 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 163 136 85 94 67 94
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 271 335 361 371 377 371 243 274 306 319 315 344
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 229 165 139 129 123 129 257 226 194 181 185 156
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Figure 36: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 84 181 303 336 271 243 97 228 387 364 335 274
# ci 416 319 197 1 0 0 403 272 113 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 163 229 257 0 0 0 136 165 226
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 107 257 389 415 361 306 75 248 401 405 371 319
# ci 393 243 111 0 0 0 425 252 99 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 85 139 194 0 0 0 94 19 181
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 68 250 411 433 377 315 39 247 401 406 371 344
# ci 432 250 89 0 0 0 461 253 99 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 67 123 185 0 0 0 94 129 156
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Figure 37: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 60 69 67 85 120 116 127 130 163 180 209 193
# ci 440 431 433 415 380 384 373 370 337 320 291 307
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 189 252 276 286 305 300 238 302 293 305 316 254
# ci 311 248 224 214 195 200 153 104 81 34 21 15
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 109 94 126 161 163 231
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 221 221 222 26 207 191 147 183 193 205 174 142
# ci 110 96 69 23 8 6 123 101 66 18 7 7
# to 169 183 209 231 285 303 230 216 241 277 319 351
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Figure 38: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 60 127 189 238 221 147 69 130 252 302 221 183
# ci 440 373 311 153 110 123 431 370 248 104 96 101
# to 0 0 0 109 169 230 0 0 0 94 183 216
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 67 163 276 293 222 193 85 180 286 305 246 205
# ci 433 337 224 81 69 66 415 320 214 34 23 18
# to 0 0 0 126 209 241 0 0 0 161 231 277
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 120 209 305 316 207 174 116 193 300 254 191 142
# ci 380 291 195 21 8 7 384 307 200 15 6 0
# to 0 0 0 163 285 319 0 0 0 231 303 351
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A.4.1. Computational Costs
Figure 39: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
deleting candidates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 29,04 seconds.
Figure 40: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by deleting can-
didates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 345,94 seconds.
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Figure 41: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by deleting
candidates in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 75,5 seconds.
Figure 42: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
deleting candidates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 63,71 seconds.
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Figure 43: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by deleting can-
didates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 290,26 seconds.
Figure 44: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by deleting
candidates in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 122,72 seconds.
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A.5. Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 45: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 10 26 24 27 16 11 39 68 87 77 72 71
# ci 490 474 476 473 484 489 461 432 413 423 428 429
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 71 96 95 78 76 52 17 41 40 32 39 27
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 429 404 405 422 424 448 483 459 460 468 461 473
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 11 13 21 11 11 11 7 1 6 5 7 8
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 489 487 479 489 489 489 493 499 494 495 493 492
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Figure 46: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 10 39 71 17 11 7 26 68 96 41 13 1
# ci 490 461 0 0 0 0 474 432 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 429 483 489 493 0 0 404 459 487 499
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 24 87 95 40 21 6 27 77 78 32 11 5
# ci 476 413 0 0 0 0 473 423 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 405 460 479 494 0 0 422 468 489 495
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 16 72 76 39 11 7 11 71 52 27 11 8
# ci 484 428 0 0 0 0 489 429 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 424 461 489 493 0 0 448 473 489 492
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Figure 47: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 7 24 20 29 61 50 25 42 55 81 91 70
# ci 493 476 480 471 439 450 475 458 445 419 409 430
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 51 73 70 68 60 48 11 21 16 23 14 20
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 449 427 430 432 440 452 489 479 484 477 486 480
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 5 9 11 9 3 6 1 4 6 2 5 0
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 495 491 489 491 497 494 499 496 494 498 495 500
51
Figure 48: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 7 25 51 11 5 1 24 42 73 21 9 4
# ci 493 475 0 0 0 0 476 458 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 449 489 495 499 0 0 427 479 491 496
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 20 55 70 16 11 6 29 81 68 23 9 2
# ci 480 455 0 0 0 0 471 419 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 430 484 489 494 0 0 432 477 491 498
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 61 91 60 14 3 5 5 70 48 20 6 0
# ci 439 409 0 0 0 0 495 430 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 440 486 497 495 0 0 452 480 494 500
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A.5.1. Computational Costs
Figure 49: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 160,89
seconds.
Figure 50: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 24,34 seconds.
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Figure 51: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 425,43 seconds.
Figure 52: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
211,22 seconds.
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Figure 53: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 23,89 seconds.
Figure 54: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 211,22 seconds.
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A.6. Destructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 55: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 107 122 131 95 76 40 248 301 324 314 303 292
# ci 393 378 369 405 424 460 252 199 176 186 197 208
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 370 429 436 439 438 419 253 363 424 416 435 419
# ci 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 121 71 64 61 62 81 246 137 76 84 65 81
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 224 279 346 393 402 390 205 273 314 341 357 361
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 276 221 154 107 98 110 295 227 186 159 143 139
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Figure 56: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 107 248 370 253 224 205 122 301 429 363 279 273
# ci 393 252 9 1 0 0 378 199 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 121 246 276 295 0 0 71 137 221 227
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 131 324 436 424 346 314 95 314 439 416 393 341
# ci 369 176 0 0 0 0 405 186 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 64 76 154 186 0 0 61 84 107 159
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 76 303 438 435 402 357 40 292 419 419 390 361
# ci 424 197 0 0 0 0 460 208 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 62 65 98 143 0 0 81 81 110 139
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Figure 57: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 82 88 88 105 163 138 178 187 215 258 286 277
# ci 418 412 412 395 337 362 322 313 285 242 214 223
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 229 279 318 307 326 304 151 222 228 228 264 226
# ci 159 138 83 56 30 29 153 104 81 34 21 15
# to 112 83 99 137 144 167 196 174 191 238 215 259
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 144 159 169 208 212 198 123 177 154 195 203 173
# ci 110 96 69 23 8 6 123 101 60 18 7 7
# to 246 245 262 269 280 296 254 222 242 287 290 320
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Figure 58: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 82 178 229 151 144 123 88 187 279 222 159 177
# ci 418 322 159 153 110 123 412 313 138 104 96 101
# to 0 0 112 196 246 254 0 0 83 174 245 222
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 88 215 318 228 169 154 105 258 307 228 208 195
# ci 412 285 83 81 69 60 395 242 56 34 23 18
# to 0 0 99 191 262 242 0 0 137 238 269 287
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 163 286 326 264 212 203 138 277 304 226 198 173
# ci 337 214 30 21 8 7 362 223 29 15 6 7
# to 0 0 144 215 280 290 0 0 167 259 296 320
59
A.6.1. Computational Costs
Figure 59: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 93,6
seconds.
Figure 60: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 23,03 seconds.
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Figure 61: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 93,6 seconds.
Figure 62: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
108,15 seconds.
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Figure 63: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 18,22 seconds.
Figure 64: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 103,95 seconds.
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A.7. Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 65: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 9 25 25 31 25 7 45 69 68 69 74 64
# ci 491 475 475 469 475 493 455 431 432 431 426 436
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 63 86 87 78 82 70 24 32 44 32 30 26
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 437 414 413 422 418 430 476 468 456 468 470 474
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 10 15 14 10 14 17 3 8 10 7 5 3
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 490 485 486 490 486 483 497 492 490 493 495 497
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Figure 66: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 9 45 63 24 10 3 25 69 86 32 15 8
# ci 491 455 0 0 0 0 475 431 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 437 476 490 497 0 0 414 468 485 492
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 25 68 87 44 14 10 31 69 78 32 10 7
# ci 475 432 0 0 0 0 469 431 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 413 456 486 490 0 0 422 468 490 493
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 25 74 82 30 14 5 7 64 7 26 17 3
# ci 475 426 0 0 0 0 493 436 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 418 470 486 495 0 0 493 474 483 497
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Figure 67: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 9 24 24 44 47 50 35 64 62 59 83 86
# ci 491 476 476 456 453 450 465 436 438 441 417 414
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 53 74 54 66 53 40 20 14 20 23 22 21
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 447 426 446 434 447 460 480 486 480 477 478 479
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 6 6 8 14 5 4 7 6 4 2 2 2
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 494 494 492 486 495 496 493 494 496 498 498 498
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Figure 68: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 9 35 53 20 6 7 24 64 74 14 6 6
# ci 491 465 0 0 0 0 476 436 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 447 480 494 493 0 0 426 486 494 494
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 24 62 54 20 8 4 44 59 66 23 14 2
# ci 476 438 0 0 0 0 456 441 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 446 480 492 496 0 0 434 477 486 498
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 47 83 53 22 5 2 50 86 40 21 4 2
# ci 453 417 0 0 0 0 450 414 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 447 478 495 498 0 0 460 479 496 498
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A.7.1. Computational Costs
Figure 69: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 136,83
seconds.
Figure 70: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 33,13 seconds.
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Figure 71: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 136,83 seconds.
Figure 72: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
179,79 seconds.
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Figure 73: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 32,92 seconds.
Figure 74: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 179,19 seconds.
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A.8. Destructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 75: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 107 122 131 95 76 40 248 301 324 314 303 292
# ci 393 378 369 405 424 460 252 199 176 186 197 208
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 367 426 432 433 434 416 250 356 415 412 434 416
# ci 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 124 74 68 67 66 84 249 144 85 88 66 84
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 224 279 346 393 402 390 205 273 314 341 357 361
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 276 221 154 107 98 110 295 227 186 159 143 139
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Figure 76: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 107 248 367 250 224 205 122 301 426 356 279 273
# ci 393 252 9 1 0 0 378 199 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 124 249 276 295 0 0 74 144 221 227
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 131 324 432 415 346 314 95 314 433 412 393 341
# ci 369 176 0 0 0 0 405 186 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 68 85 154 186 0 0 67 88 107 159
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 76 303 434 434 402 357 40 292 416 416 390 361
# ci 424 197 0 0 0 0 460 208 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 66 66 98 143 0 0 84 84 110 139
71
Figure 77: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 82 88 88 105 163 138 178 187 215 258 286 277
# ci 418 412 412 395 337 362 322 313 285 242 214 223
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 221 276 306 301 321 304 151 222 228 228 264 226
# ci 159 137 83 56 30 29 153 104 81 34 21 15
# to 120 87 111 143 149 167 196 174 191 238 215 259
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 144 159 169 208 212 198 123 177 168 194 203 173
# ci 110 96 69 23 8 6 123 101 66 18 7 7
# to 246 245 262 269 280 296 254 222 266 288 290 320
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Figure 78: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 82 178 221 151 144 123 88 187 276 222 159 177
# ci 418 322 159 153 110 123 412 313 137 104 96 101
# to 0 0 120 196 246 254 0 0 87 174 245 222
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 88 215 306 228 169 168 105 258 301 228 208 194
# ci 412 285 83 81 69 66 395 242 56 34 23 18
# to 0 0 111 191 262 266 0 0 143 238 269 288
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 163 286 321 264 212 203 138 277 304 226 198 173
# ci 337 214 30 21 8 7 362 223 29 15 6 7
# to 0 0 149 215 280 290 0 0 167 259 296 320
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A.8.1. Computational Costs
Figure 79: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 93,92
seconds.
Figure 80: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 31,75 seconds.
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Figure 81: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 93,92 seconds.
Figure 82: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
108,35 seconds.
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Figure 83: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 24,8 seconds.
Figure 84: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 104,12 seconds.
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A.9. Constructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 85: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 8 27 23 29 22 13 23 47 60 65 60 40
# ci 492 473 477 471 478 487 477 453 440 435 440 460
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 45 81 92 80 87 57 36 59 47 50 41 43
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 455 419 408 420 413 443 464 441 453 450 459 457
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 11 21 25 33 22 19 7 8 10 15 9 10
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 489 479 475 467 478 481 493 492 490 485 491 490
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Figure 86: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 8 23 45 36 11 7 27 47 81 59 21 8
# ci 492 477 0 0 0 0 473 453 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 455 464 489 493 0 0 419 441 479 492
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 23 60 92 47 25 10 29 65 80 50 33 15
# ci 477 440 0 0 0 0 471 435 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 408 453 475 490 0 0 420 450 467 485
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 22 60 87 41 22 9 13 40 57 43 19 10
# ci 478 440 0 0 0 0 487 460 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 413 459 478 491 0 0 443 457 481 490
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Figure 87: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 5 15 21 34 56 47 18 42 43 54 62 55
# ci 495 485 479 466 444 453 482 458 457 446 438 445
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 26 37 59 68 63 52 9 28 34 33 33 32
# ci 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 461 463 441 432 437 448 491 472 466 467 467 468
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 8 15 10 18 11 11 4 5 5 4 7 5
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 492 485 490 482 489 489 496 495 495 496 493 495
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Figure 88: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 5 18 26 9 8 4 15 42 37 28 15 5
# ci 495 482 13 0 0 0 485 458 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 461 491 492 496 0 0 463 472 485 495
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 21 43 59 34 10 5 34 54 68 33 18 4
# ci 479 457 0 0 0 0 466 446 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 441 466 490 495 0 0 432 467 482 496
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 56 62 63 33 11 7 47 55 52 32 11 5
# ci 444 438 0 0 0 0 453 445 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 437 467 489 493 0 0 448 468 489 495
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A.9.1. Computational Costs
Figure 89: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is
214,19 seconds.
Figure 90: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 20,2
seconds.
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Figure 91: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 214,19
seconds.
Figure 92: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 229,26 seconds.
82
Figure 93: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
592,3 seconds.
Figure 94: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
229,26 seconds.
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A.10. Destructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 95: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candidates
in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 102 105 109 90 73 40 236 285 310 292 288 270
# ci 398 395 391 410 427 460 264 215 190 208 212 230
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 361 428 432 429 416 397 292 371 409 407 414 381
# ci 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 130 72 68 71 84 103 207 129 91 93 86 119
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 241 284 336 370 386 335 233 272 287 302 319 313
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 259 216 164 130 114 165 267 228 213 198 181 187
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Figure 96: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candidates
in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 102 236 361 292 241 233 105 285 428 371 284 272
# ci 398 264 9 1 0 0 395 215 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 130 207 259 267 0 0 72 129 216 228
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 109 310 432 409 336 287 90 292 429 407 370 302
# ci 391 190 0 0 0 0 410 208 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 68 91 164 213 0 0 71 93 130 198
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 73 288 416 414 386 319 40 270 397 381 335 313
# ci 427 212 0 0 0 0 460 230 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 84 86 114 181 0 0 103 119 165 187
85
Figure 97: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 79 84 80 100 148 126 168 180 204 247 280 271
# ci 421 416 420 400 352 374 332 320 296 253 220 229
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 227 276 324 319 340 319 169 233 230 243 276 230
# ci 159 137 83 56 30 29 153 104 81 34 21 15
# to 114 87 93 125 130 152 178 163 189 223 203 255
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 149 167 171 205 217 183 126 163 162 179 172 153
# ci 110 96 69 23 8 6 123 101 66 18 7 7
# to 241 237 260 272 275 311 251 236 272 303 321 340
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Figure 98: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 79 168 227 169 149 126 84 180 276 233 167 163
# ci 421 332 159 153 110 123 416 320 137 104 96 101
# to 0 0 114 178 241 251 0 0 87 163 237 236
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 80 204 324 230 171 162 100 247 319 243 205 179
# ci 420 296 83 81 69 66 400 253 56 34 23 18
# to 0 0 93 189 260 272 0 0 125 223 272 303
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 148 280 340 276 217 172 126 271 319 230 183 153
# ci 352 220 30 21 8 7 374 374 6 15 6 7
# to 0 0 130 203 275 321 0 0 311 255 311 340
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A.10.1. Computational Costs
Figure 99: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is
59,44 seconds.
Figure 100: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is
20,16 seconds.
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Figure 101: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is
59,44 seconds.
Figure 102: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 58,6 seconds.
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Figure 103: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
15,84 seconds.
Figure 104: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
56,03 seconds.
90
A.11. Constructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 105: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 14 20 20 30 22 11 31 45 65 71 55 43
# ci 486 480 480 470 478 489 469 455 435 429 445 457
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 42 85 73 89 95 59 29 58 50 55 48 46
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 458 415 427 411 405 441 471 442 450 445 452 454
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 12 20 21 19 23 19 50 9 11 10 4 9
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 488 480 479 481 477 481 495 491 489 490 496 491
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Figure 106: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 140 31 42 29 12 5 20 45 85 58 20 9
# ci 486 469 0 0 0 0 480 455 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 458 471 488 495 0 0 415 442 480 491
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 20 65 73 50 21 11 30 71 89 55 19 10
# ci 480 435 0 0 0 0 470 429 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 427 450 479 489 0 0 411 445 481 490
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 22 55 95 48 23 4 11 43 59 46 19 9
# ci 478 445 0 0 0 0 489 457 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 405 452 477 496 0 0 441 454 481 491
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Figure 107: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of can-
didates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 9 19 23 35 54 43 21 36 43 49 59 68
# ci 491 481 477 465 446 457 479 464 457 451 441 432
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 32 53 52 69 69 61 14 29 27 44 32 31
# ci 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 445 447 448 431 431 439 486 471 473 456 468 469
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 12 18 12 15 16 13 0 5 7 5 6 9
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 488 482 488 485 484 487 500 495 493 495 494 491
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Figure 108: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of can-
didates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 9 21 32 14 12 0 19 36 53 29 18 5
# ci 491 479 23 0 0 0 481 464 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 445 486 488 500 0 0 447 471 482 495
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 23 43 52 27 12 7 35 49 69 44 15 5
# ci 477 457 0 0 0 0 465 451 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 448 473 488 493 0 0 431 456 485 495
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 54 59 69 32 16 6 43 68 61 31 13 9
# ci 446 441 0 0 0 0 457 432 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 431 468 484 494 0 0 439 469 487 491
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A.11.1. Computational Costs
Figure 109: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 168,02 seconds.
Figure 110: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 20,47
seconds.
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Figure 111: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is
168,02 seconds.
Figure 112: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 123,59 seconds.
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Figure 113: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
587,95 seconds.
Figure 114: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
263,04 seconds.
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A.12. Destructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 115: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 102 105 109 89 73 40 222 268 300 281 275 266
# ci 398 395 391 411 427 460 278 232 200 219 225 234
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 347 421 423 422 414 389 277 357 399 399 407 374
# ci 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 144 79 77 78 86 111 222 143 101 101 93 126
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 225 272 325 363 382 327 223 262 284 294 314 312
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 275 228 175 137 118 173 277 238 216 206 186 188
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Figure 116: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 102 222 347 277 225 223 105 268 421 357 272 262
# ci 398 278 9 1 0 0 395 232 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 144 222 275 277 0 0 79 143 228 238
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 109 300 423 399 325 284 89 281 422 399 363 294
# ci 391 200 0 0 0 0 411 219 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 77 101 175 216 0 0 78 101 137 206
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 73 275 414 407 382 314 40 266 389 374 327 312
# ci 427 225 0 0 0 0 460 234 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 86 93 118 186 0 0 111 126 173 188
99
Figure 117: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 79 84 80 100 148 126 159 172 197 242 278 271
# ci 421 416 420 400 352 374 341 328 303 258 222 229
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 212 268 320 317 339 319 156 228 220 240 276 230
# ci 159 137 83 56 30 29 153 104 81 34 21 15
# to 129 95 97 127 131 152 191 168 199 203 203 255
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 141 163 169 202 216 182 122 159 159 178 171 152
# ci 110 96 69 23 8 6 123 101 66 18 7 7
# to 249 241 262 275 276 312 255 240 275 304 322 341
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Figure 118: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 79 159 212 156 141 122 84 172 268 228 163 159
# ci 421 341 159 153 110 123 416 328 137 104 96 101
# to 0 0 129 191 249 255 0 0 95 168 241 240
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 80 197 320 220 169 159 100 242 317 240 202 178
# ci 420 303 83 81 69 66 400 258 56 34 23 18
# to 0 0 97 199 262 275 0 0 127 226 275 304
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 148 278 339 276 216 171 126 271 319 230 182 152
# ci 352 222 30 21 8 7 374 229 29 15 6 7
# to 0 0 131 203 276 322 0 0 152 255 312 341
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A.12.1. Computational Costs
Figure 119: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 60,76 seconds.
Figure 120: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is
19,94 seconds.
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Figure 121: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 60,76
seconds.
Figure 122: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 58,04 seconds.
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Figure 123: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
15,75 seconds.
Figure 124: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is
55,48 seconds.
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A.13. Constructive Control by Adding Voters
Figure 125: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding voters. Number of
candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 100 154 277 395 474 492 55 119 239 365 447 494
# ci 400 346 223 1 0 0 445 381 261 1 0 0
# to 0 0 0 104 26 8 0 0 0 134 53 6
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 42 98 186 299 417 482 21 60 163 273 393 491
# ci 458 402 314 2 0 0 479 440 337 12 0 0
# to 0 0 0 199 83 18 0 0 0 215 107 9
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 11 40 98 199 328 464 4 19 68 152 292 446
# ci 489 460 376 23 0 0 496 481 225 28 1 0
# to 0 0 26 278 172 36 0 0 207 320 207 54
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Figure 126: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding voters. Number of
voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 100 55 42 21 11 4 154 119 98 60 40 19
# ci 400 445 458 479 479 496 346 381 402 440 460 481
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 277 239 186 163 98 68 395 365 299 273 199 152
# ci 223 261 314 337 376 225 1 1 2 12 23 28
# to 0 0 0 0 26 207 104 134 199 215 278 320
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 474 447 417 393 328 292 492 494 482 491 464 446
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 26 53 83 107 172 207 8 6 18 9 36 54
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Figure 127: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding voters. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 75 98 142 147 187 206 48 63 116 119 161 169
# ci 425 402 358 157 130 151 452 437 384 226 188 183
# to 0 0 0 196 183 143 0 0 0 155 151 148
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 27 45 69 86 114 134 15 34 44 41 76 95
# ci 473 455 432 291 282 266 485 466 347 350 327 319
# to 0 0 0 123 104 100 0 0 109 109 97 86
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 9 17 19 23 31 56 7 7 10 8 18 28
# ci 491 483 411 390 378 377 493 493 423 423 421 425
# to 0 0 70 87 91 67 0 0 67 69 61 47
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Figure 128: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding voters. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 75 48 27 15 9 7 98 63 45 34 17 7
# ci 425 452 473 485 491 493 402 437 455 466 483 493
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 142 116 69 44 19 10 147 119 86 41 23 8
# ci 358 384 431 347 411 423 157 226 291 350 390 423
# to 0 0 0 109 70 67 196 155 123 109 87 69
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 187 161 114 76 31 18 206 169 134 95 56 28
# ci 130 188 282 327 378 421 151 183 266 319 377 425
# to 183 151 104 97 91 61 143 148 100 86 67 47
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A.13.1. Computational Costs
Figure 129: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding voters in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 71,62 seconds.
Figure 130: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding
voters in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 210,51 seconds.
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Figure 131: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
voters in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 110,45 seconds.
Figure 132: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding voters in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 74,8 seconds.
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Figure 133: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding
voters in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 233,48 seconds.
Figure 134: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
voters in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 29,26 seconds.
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A.14. Constructive Control by Deleting Voters
Figure 135: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting voters. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 100 203 418 442 463 487 57 140 350 409 422 472
# ci 400 297 82 0 0 0 443 360 150 2 0 0
# to 0 0 0 58 37 13 0 0 0 89 78 28
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 44 92 277 348 372 431 25 73 212 300 307 382
# ci 456 408 223 7 0 0 475 427 288 8 0 0
# to 0 0 0 145 128 69 0 0 0 192 193 118
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 17 43 151 198 258 348 8 23 89 142 186 302
# ci 483 457 349 29 0 0 492 477 193 42 1 0
# to 0 0 0 237 242 152 0 0 218 316 313 198
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Figure 136: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting voters. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 100 57 44 25 17 8 203 140 92 73 43 23
# ci 400 443 456 475 483 492 297 360 408 427 457 477
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 418 350 277 212 151 89 442 409 348 300 198 142
# ci 82 150 223 288 349 193 0 2 7 8 29 42
# to 0 0 0 0 0 218 58 89 145 192 273 316
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 463 422 372 307 258 186 487 472 431 382 348 302
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 37 78 128 193 242 313 13 28 69 118 152 198
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Figure 137: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting voters. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 66 91 191 196 174 159 43 68 124 118 131 145
# ci 434 409 309 135 132 133 457 432 376 241 219 210
# to 0 0 0 169 194 208 0 0 0 141 150 145
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 33 32 83 86 82 105 18 27 64 52 63 62
# ci 467 468 417 284 285 264 482 473 436 359 328 332
# to 0 0 0 130 133 131 0 0 0 89 109 106
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 4 17 27 36 48 44 6 8 16 23 27 26
# ci 496 483 473 384 383 388 494 492 473 415 425 415
# to 0 0 0 80 69 68 0 0 11 62 48 59
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Figure 138: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting voters. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 66 43 33 18 4 6 91 68 32 27 17 8
# ci 434 457 467 482 496 494 409 432 468 473 483 492
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 191 124 83 64 27 16 196 118 86 52 36 23
# ci 309 376 417 436 473 473 135 241 284 359 384 415
# to 0 0 0 0 0 11 169 141 130 89 80 62
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 174 131 82 63 48 27 159 145 105 62 44 26
# ci 132 219 285 328 383 425 133 210 264 332 388 415
# to 194 150 133 109 69 48 208 145 131 106 68 59
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A.14.1. Computational Costs
Figure 139: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting voters in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 79,32 seconds.
Figure 140: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
voters in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 114,99 seconds.
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Figure 141: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
voters in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 88,57 seconds.
Figure 142: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting voters in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 65,48 seconds.
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Figure 143: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
voters in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 42,8 seconds.
Figure 144: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
voters in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 42,28 seconds.
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A.15. Constructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TE
Figure 145: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 125 311 451 464 434 353 97 276 457 485 470 448
# ci 375 189 49 0 0 0 403 224 43 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 36 66 147 0 0 0 15 30 52
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 61 192 441 461 417 469 44 152 388 449 467 480
# ci 439 308 1 0 0 0 456 348 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 58 39 29 31 0 0 112 51 33 20
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 21 94 323 369 446 481 11 47 239 314 403 461
# ci 479 406 0 0 0 0 489 453 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 177 131 54 19 0 0 261 186 97 39
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Figure 146: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 125 97 61 44 21 11 311 276 192 152 94 47
# ci 375 403 439 456 479 489 189 224 308 348 406 453
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 451 457 441 388 323 239 464 485 461 449 369 314
# ci 49 43 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 58 112 177 261 36 15 39 51 131 186
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 434 470 471 467 446 403 353 448 469 480 481 461
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 66 30 29 33 54 97 147 52 31 20 19 39
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Figure 147: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 70 126 172 164 143 130 60 94 149 127 130 127
# ci 430 374 328 111 97 82 440 406 351 95 55 49
# to 0 0 0 225 260 288 0 0 0 278 315 324
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 34 68 104 95 100 124 18 47 74 65 80 82
# ci 466 432 136 51 40 26 482 453 72 32 22 14
# to 0 0 260 354 360 350 0 0 354 403 398 404
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 14 27 58 31 41 45 1 16 37 9 28 31
# ci 486 473 63 29 8 7 499 484 56 23 10 2
# to 0 0 379 440 451 448 0 0 407 468 462 467
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Figure 148: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 70 60 34 18 14 1 126 94 68 47 27 16
# ci 430 440 466 482 486 499 374 406 432 453 472 484
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 172 149 104 74 58 37 164 127 95 65 31 9
# ci 328 351 136 72 63 56 111 95 51 32 29 23
# to 0 0 260 354 379 407 225 278 354 403 440 468
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 143 130 100 80 41 28 130 127 124 80 41 31
# ci 97 55 40 22 8 10 82 49 26 22 10 2
# to 260 315 360 398 451 462 288 324 350 398 462 467
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A.15.1. Computational Costs
Figure 149: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of voters in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 53,51
seconds.
Figure 150: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 586,56 seconds.
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Figure 151: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
voters in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 53,51 seconds.
Figure 152: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of voters in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 61,41
seconds.
124
Figure 153: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 289,18 seconds.
Figure 154: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 208,95 seconds.
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A.16. Destructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TE
Figure 155: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 251 391 478 474 405 287 369 477 500 493 454 406
# ci 249 109 22 0 0 0 131 23 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 26 95 213 0 0 0 7 46 94
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 432 491 499 498 479 458 465 497 500 499 482 466
# ci 68 9 1 0 0 0 35 3 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 2 21 42 0 0 0 1 18 34
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 480 498 500 500 494 474 489 500 500 499 497 493
# ci 20 2 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 6 26 0 0 0 1 3 7
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Figure 156: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 251 369 432 465 480 489 391 477 491 497 498 500
# ci 249 131 68 35 20 11 109 23 9 3 2 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 478 500 499 500 500 500 474 493 498 499 500 499
# ci 22 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 7 2 1 0 1
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 405 454 479 482 494 497 287 406 458 466 474 493
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 95 46 21 18 6 3 213 94 42 34 26 7
127
Figure 157: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 178 237 247 218 169 153 217 294 325 321 231 229
# ci 322 263 253 132 95 79 283 206 175 86 64 49
# to 0 0 0 150 236 268 0 0 0 93 205 222
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 272 320 373 383 300 244 325 369 410 399 334 266
# ci 228 180 110 48 41 35 175 131 63 35 16 17
# to 0 0 17 69 159 221 0 0 27 66 150 217
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 352 375 414 425 333 258 343 384 437 440 354 283
# ci 148 125 64 23 10 11 157 116 46 31 3 5
# to 0 0 0 52 157 231 0 0 17 29 143 212
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Figure 158: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 178 217 272 325 352 343 237 294 320 369 375 384
# ci 322 283 228 175 148 157 263 206 180 131 125 116
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 247 325 373 410 414 437 218 321 383 399 425 440
# ci 253 175 110 63 64 46 132 86 48 35 23 31
# to 0 0 17 27 22 17 150 93 69 66 52 29
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 169 231 300 334 333 354 153 229 244 266 258 283
# ci 95 64 41 16 10 3 79 49 35 17 11 5
# to 236 205 159 150 157 143 268 222 221 217 231 212
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A.16.1. Computational Costs
Figure 159: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 35,22
seconds.
Figure 160: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 596,35 seconds.
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Figure 161: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 35,22 seconds.
Figure 162: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 29,74
seconds.
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Figure 163: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 121,13 seconds.
Figure 164: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 48,7 seconds.48,7
seconds.
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A.17. Constructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TP
Figure 165: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 62 108 207 206 162 112 46 108 236 242 195 129
# ci 438 392 293 0 0 0 454 392 232 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 294 338 388 0 0 32 258 305 371
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 34 117 263 252 166 122 30 91 201 231 166 117
# ci 466 383 0 0 0 0 470 409 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 237 248 334 378 0 0 299 269 334 383
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 5 69 182 188 160 102 10 46 139 194 122 63
# ci 495 431 0 0 0 0 490 454 0 0 0 1
# to 0 0 318 312 340 398 0 0 361 306 378 369
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Figure 166: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 62 46 34 30 5 10 108 108 117 91 69 46
# ci 438 454 466 470 495 490 392 392 383 409 431 454
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 207 236 263 201 182 139 206 242 252 231 188 194
# ci 293 232 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 32 237 299 318 361 294 258 248 269 312 306
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 162 195 166 166 160 122 112 129 122 117 102 63
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
# to 338 305 334 334 340 378 388 371 378 383 398 369
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Figure 167: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 61 76 99 85 67 66 29 64 96 76 71 51
# ci 439 424 401 111 97 82 471 436 390 95 55 49
# to 0 0 0 304 336 352 0 0 14 329 374 400
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 17 52 72 57 42 48 17 32 60 34 41 40
# ci 483 448 89 50 40 26 483 468 70 33 22 14
# to 0 0 339 393 418 426 0 0 370 433 437 446
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 12 25 49 20 27 25 5 10 31 6 14 13
# ci 488 475 62 27 8 7 495 490 57 23 10 2
# to 0 0 389 453 465 468 0 0 412 471 476 485
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Figure 168: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 61 29 17 17 12 5 76 64 52 32 25 10
# ci 439 471 483 483 488 495 424 436 448 468 475 490
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 99 96 72 60 49 31 85 76 57 34 20 6
# ci 401 390 89 70 62 57 111 95 50 33 27 23
# to 0 14 339 370 389 412 304 329 393 433 453 471
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 67 71 42 41 27 14 66 51 48 40 25 13
# ci 97 55 40 22 8 1 82 49 26 14 7 2
# to 336 374 418 437 465 476 352 400 446 446 468 485
136
A.17.1. Computational Costs
Figure 169: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 89,37
seconds.
Figure 170: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 564,65 seconds.
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Figure 171: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 301,87 seconds.
Figure 172: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 106,58
seconds.
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Figure 173: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 393,18 seconds.
Figure 174: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 336,56 seconds.
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A.18. Destructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TP
Figure 175: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 185 267 421 411 302 196 310 435 497 484 427 357
# ci 315 233 79 0 0 0 190 65 3 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 89 198 304 0 0 0 16 73 143
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 407 480 498 496 473 425 455 495 500 498 485 456
# ci 93 20 0 0 0 0 45 5 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 2 4 27 75 0 0 0 2 15 44
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 480 494 500 499 495 474 489 500 500 499 497 493
# ci 20 6 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 1 5 26 0 0 0 1 3 7
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Figure 176: Results for fallback voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 185 310 407 455 480 489 267 435 480 495 494 500
# ci 315 190 93 45 20 11 233 65 20 5 6 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 421 497 498 500 500 500 411 484 496 498 499 499
# ci 79 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 2 0 0 0 89 16 4 2 1 1
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 302 427 473 485 495 497 196 357 425 456 474 493
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 198 73 27 15 5 3 304 143 75 44 26 7
141
Figure 177: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 148 192 218 173 145 133 194 265 317 301 228 234
# ci 352 308 282 132 95 79 306 235 182 86 64 49
# to 0 0 0 195 260 288 0 0 1 113 208 217
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 260 315 364 374 304 258 319 365 407 391 340 283
# ci 240 185 96 48 41 35 181 135 63 35 16 17
# to 0 0 40 78 155 207 0 0 30 74 144 200
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 351 375 413 420 340 281 341 385 436 437 361 297
# ci 149 125 64 23 10 11 159 115 46 31 3 5
# to 0 0 23 57 150 208 0 0 18 32 136 198
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Figure 178: Results for fallback voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 148 194 260 319 351 341 192 265 315 365 375 385
# ci 352 306 240 181 149 159 308 235 185 135 125 115
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 218 317 364 407 413 436 173 301 374 391 420 437
# ci 282 182 96 63 64 46 132 86 48 35 23 31
# to 0 1 40 30 23 18 195 113 78 74 57 32
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 145 228 304 340 340 361 133 234 258 283 281 297
# ci 95 64 41 16 10 3 79 49 35 17 11 5
# to 260 208 155 144 150 136 288 217 207 200 208 198
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A.18.1. Computational Costs
Figure 179: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 60,49
seconds.
Figure 180: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 527,4 seconds.
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Figure 181: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in fallback elections in the IC model. The maximum is 82,22 seconds.
Figure 182: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 42
seconds.
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Figure 183: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 173,62 seconds.
Figure 184: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in fallback elections in the TM model. The maximum is 93,34 seconds.
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B. Bucklin Voting
B.1. Constructive Control by Adding Candidates
Figure 185: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 40 62 73 77 78 107 42 48 77 78 85 95
# ci 460 438 427 423 422 393 458 452 423 422 415 405
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 29 61 70 108 115 117 17 25 30 38 44 64
# ci 471 439 430 392 385 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 383 483 475 470 462 456 436
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 5 12 10 15 16 15 0 4 2 7 5 8
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 495 488 490 485 484 485 500 496 498 493 495 492
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Figure 186: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 40 42 29 17 5 0 62 48 61 25 12 4
# ci 460 458 471 0 0 0 438 452 439 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 483 495 500 0 0 0 475 488 496
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 73 77 70 30 10 2 77 78 108 38 15 7
# ci 427 423 430 0 0 0 423 422 392 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 470 490 498 0 0 0 462 485 493
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 78 85 115 44 16 5 107 95 117 64 15 8
# ci 422 415 385 0 0 0 393 405 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 456 484 495 0 0 383 436 485 492
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Figure 187: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 33 33 39 43 35 53 19 28 31 38 40 50
# ci 467 467 461 457 465 447 481 472 469 462 460 450
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 13 15 24 37 32 32 10 20 12 8 8 4
# ci 487 485 476 463 468 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 468 490 480 488 492 492 496
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 5 4 1 3 3 1 0 1 2 2 0 1
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 495 496 499 497 497 499 500 499 498 498 500 499
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Figure 188: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 33 19 13 10 5 0 33 28 15 20 4 1
# ci 467 481 487 0 0 0 467 472 485 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 490 495 500 0 0 0 480 496 499
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 39 31 24 12 1 2 43 38 37 8 3 2
# ci 461 469 476 0 0 0 457 462 463 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 488 499 498 0 0 0 492 497 498
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 35 40 32 8 3 0 53 50 32 4 1 1
# ci 465 460 468 0 0 0 447 450 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 492 497 500 0 0 468 496 499 499
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B.1.1. Computational Costs
Figure 189: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 148 seconds.
Figure 190: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding
candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 537,35 seconds.
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Figure 191: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 427,51 seconds.
Figure 192: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 85,81 seconds.
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Figure 193: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding
candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 523,05 seconds.
Figure 194: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 491,13 seconds.
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B.2. Destructive Control by Adding Candidates
Figure 195: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 357 374 360 377 371 389 405 426 444 456 468 447
# ci 143 126 140 123 129 111 95 74 56 44 32 53
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 430 463 483 492 493 497 397 453 468 484 486 485
# ci 70 37 17 8 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 3 102 47 32 16 14 15
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 399 420 427 456 456 459 387 411 409 409 435 438
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 101 80 73 44 44 41 113 89 91 91 65 62
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Figure 196: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 357 405 430 397 399 387 374 426 463 453 420 411
# ci 143 95 70 1 0 0 126 74 37 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 102 101 113 0 0 0 47 80 89
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 360 444 483 468 427 409 377 456 492 484 456 409
# ci 140 56 17 0 0 0 123 44 8 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 32 73 91 0 0 0 16 44 91
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 371 468 493 486 456 435 389 447 497 485 459 438
# ci 129 32 7 0 0 0 111 53 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 14 44 65 0 0 3 15 41 62
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Figure 197: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 211 218 240 263 284 305 237 283 325 350 343 349
# ci 289 282 260 237 216 195 263 217 175 150 157 151
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 254 306 315 370 385 362 274 305 339 355 356 361
# ci 246 194 185 130 115 19 135 104 62 27 9 6
# to 0 0 0 0 0 119 91 91 99 118 135 133
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 275 306 321 368 356 369 294 299 326 344 340 365
# ci 124 105 61 24 6 8 109 94 64 22 7 1
# to 101 89 118 108 138 123 97 107 110 134 153 134
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Figure 198: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 211 237 254 274 275 294 218 283 306 305 306 299
# ci 289 263 246 135 124 109 282 217 194 104 105 94
# to 0 0 0 91 101 97 0 0 0 91 89 107
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 240 325 315 339 321 326 263 350 370 355 368 344
# ci 26 175 185 62 61 64 237 150 130 27 24 22
# to 0 0 0 99 118 110 0 0 0 118 108 134
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 284 343 385 356 356 340 305 349 362 361 369 365
# ci 216 157 115 9 6 7 195 151 19 6 8 1
# to 0 0 0 135 138 153 0 0 119 133 123 134
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B.2.1. Computational Costs
Figure 199: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
adding candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 13,77 seconds.
Figure 200: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by adding can-
didates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 532,06 seconds.
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Figure 201: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by adding
candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 13,77 seconds.
Figure 202: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
adding candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 9,61 seconds.
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Figure 203: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by adding can-
didates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 444,22 seconds.
Figure 204: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by adding
candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 107,28 seconds.
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B.3. Constructive Control by Deleting Candidates
Figure 205: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 124 187 154 205 186 198 167 154 175 212 185 221
# ci 376 313 346 295 314 302 333 346 325 288 315 279
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 181 218 251 265 288 302 163 194 203 235 254 245
# ci 319 282 249 235 212 198 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 337 306 297 265 246 255
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 132 149 136 122 151 137 89 78 98 70 67 81
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 368 351 364 378 349 363 411 422 402 430 433 419
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Figure 206: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 124 167 181 163 132 89 187 154 218 194 149 78
# ci 376 333 319 0 0 0 313 346 282 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 337 368 411 0 0 0 306 351 422
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 154 175 251 203 136 98 205 212 265 235 122 70
# ci 346 325 249 0 0 0 295 288 235 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 297 364 402 0 0 0 265 378 430
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 186 185 288 254 151 67 198 221 302 245 137 81
# ci 314 315 212 0 0 0 302 279 198 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 246 349 433 0 0 0 255 363 419
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Figure 207: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting candidates.
Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 124 172 191 197 206 185 151 138 146 166 189 182
# ci 376 328 309 303 294 315 349 362 354 334 311 318
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 176 182 203 223 202 207 153 152 176 162 154 165
# ci 324 318 297 277 298 293 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 347 348 324 338 346 335
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 133 127 131 136 111 122 128 107 91 87 97 93
# ci 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 365 373 369 364 389 378 372 393 409 413 403 407
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Figure 208: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting candidates.
Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 124 151 176 153 133 128 172 138 182 152 127 107
# ci 376 349 324 0 2 0 328 362 318 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 347 365 372 0 0 0 348 373 393
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 191 146 203 176 131 91 197 166 223 162 136 87
# ci 309 354 297 0 0 0 303 334 277 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 324 369 409 0 0 0 338 364 413
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 206 189 202 154 111 97 185 182 207 165 122 93
# ci 294 311 298 0 0 0 315 318 293 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 346 389 403 0 0 0 335 378 407
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B.3.1. Computational Costs
Figure 209: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 61,64 seconds.
Figure 210: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 428,06 seconds.
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Figure 211: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 178,54 seconds.
Figure 212: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 42,25 seconds.
166
Figure 213: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 415,02 seconds.
Figure 214: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 247,38 seconds.
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B.4. Destructive Control by Deleting Candidates
Figure 215: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 241 251 266 281 286 276 349 385 422 426 430 441
# ci 259 249 234 219 214 224 151 115 78 74 70 59
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 453 481 490 495 497 496 415 465 480 489 495 493
# ci 47 19 10 5 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 35 20 11 5 7
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 349 394 436 470 478 475 247 340 381 392 434 458
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 151 106 64 30 22 25 253 160 119 108 66 42
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Figure 216: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 241 349 453 415 349 247 251 385 481 465 394 340
# ci 259 151 47 1 0 0 249 115 19 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 84 151 253 0 0 0 35 106 160
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 266 422 490 480 436 381 281 426 495 489 470 392
# ci 234 78 10 0 0 0 219 74 5 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 20 64 119 0 0 0 11 30 108
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 286 430 497 495 478 434 276 441 496 493 475 458
# ci 214 70 3 0 0 0 224 59 4 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 5 22 66 0 0 0 7 25 42
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Figure 217: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 143 123 143 137 182 193 206 232 261 282 319 276
# ci 357 377 357 363 318 307 294 268 239 218 181 224
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 296 304 354 379 386 354 297 314 344 352 316 322
# ci 204 196 146 121 114 146 146 129 78 46 18 14
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 57 78 102 166 164
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 239 274 286 280 270 219 172 198 208 202 192 170
# ci 137 91 68 29 11 10 114 89 75 23 9 4
# to 124 135 146 191 219 271 214 213 217 275 299 326
170
Figure 218: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 143 206 296 297 239 172 123 232 304 314 274 198
# ci 357 294 204 146 137 114 377 268 196 129 91 89
# to 0 0 0 57 124 214 0 0 0 57 135 213
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 143 261 354 344 286 208 137 282 379 352 280 202
# ci 357 239 146 78 68 75 363 218 121 46 29 23
# to 0 0 0 78 146 217 0 0 0 102 191 275
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 182 319 386 316 270 192 193 276 354 322 219 170
# ci 318 181 114 18 11 9 307 224 146 14 10 4
# to 0 0 0 166 219 299 0 0 0 164 271 326
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B.4.1. Computational Costs
Figure 219: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
deleting candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 25,59 seconds.
Figure 220: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by deleting
candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 420,05 seconds.
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Figure 221: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by deleting
candidates in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 25,59 seconds.
Figure 222: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
deleting candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 63,26 seconds.
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Figure 223: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by deleting
candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 309,1 seconds.
Figure 224: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by deleting
candidates in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 106,02 seconds.
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B.5. Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 225: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 42 93 114 127 150 172 147 205 231 284 284 300
# ci 458 407 386 373 350 328 353 295 269 216 216 200
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 196 256 252 223 200 191 41 39 62 63 66 55
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 304 244 248 277 300 309 459 461 438 437 434 445
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 15 24 11 15 23 17 6 6 3 10 8 8
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 485 476 489 485 477 483 494 494 497 490 492 492
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Figure 226: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 42 147 196 41 15 6 93 205 256 39 24 6
# ci 458 353 0 0 0 0 407 295 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 304 459 485 494 0 0 244 461 476 494
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 114 231 252 62 11 3 127 284 223 63 15 10
# ci 386 269 0 0 0 0 373 216 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 248 438 489 497 0 0 277 437 485 490
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 150 284 200 66 23 8 172 300 191 55 17 8
# ci 350 216 0 0 0 0 328 200 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 300 434 477 492 0 0 309 445 483 492
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Figure 227: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 27 50 87 87 120 126 94 125 150 168 187 223
# ci 473 450 413 413 380 374 406 375 350 332 313 277
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 105 126 142 99 114 80 27 32 40 36 29 120
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 395 374 358 401 386 420 473 468 460 464 471 488
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 8 13 7 10 10 11 9 4 1 3 2 1
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 492 487 493 490 490 489 491 496 499 497 498 499
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Figure 228: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 27 94 105 27 8 9 50 125 126 32 13 4
# ci 473 406 0 0 0 0 450 375 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 305 473 492 491 0 0 374 468 487 496
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 87 150 142 40 7 1 87 168 99 36 10 30
# ci 413 350 0 0 0 0 413 332 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 358 460 493 499 0 0 401 464 490 497
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 120 187 114 29 10 2 126 223 80 12 11 1
# ci 380 313 0 0 0 0 374 277 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 386 471 490 498 0 0 420 488 489 499
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B.5.1. Computational Costs
Figure 229: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is
286,05 seconds.
Figure 230: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 26,26 seconds.
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Figure 231: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 286,05 seconds.
Figure 232: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
142,58 seconds.
180
Figure 233: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 26,14 seconds.
Figure 234: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 142,58 seconds.
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B.6. Destructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 235: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 316 312 320 340 312 429 465 480 486 487 484
# ci 212 184 188 180 160 188 71 35 20 14 13 16
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 488 496 500 499 498 499 353 438 478 494 494 495
# ci 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 8 4 0 1 2 1 146 62 22 6 6 5
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 244 349 417 462 465 472 244 325 379 406 426 446
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 356 151 83 38 35 28 256 175 121 94 74 54
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Figure 236: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 429 488 353 244 244 316 465 496 438 349 325
# ci 212 71 4 1 0 0 184 35 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 8 146 256 256 0 0 4 62 151 175
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 312 480 500 478 417 379 320 486 499 494 462 406
# ci 188 20 0 0 0 0 180 14 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 22 83 121 0 0 1 6 38 94
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 340 487 498 494 465 426 312 484 499 495 472 446
# ci 160 13 0 0 0 0 188 16 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 2 6 35 74 0 0 1 5 28 54
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Figure 237: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 213 174 199 197 250 280 270 302 322 381 408 394
# ci 287 326 301 303 250 220 230 198 178 119 92 106
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 320 325 365 389 387 343 216 247 273 291 282 285
# ci 165 152 105 61 43 37 146 129 78 46 18 14
# to 15 23 3 50 70 120 138 124 149 163 200 201
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 160 193 237 240 246 213 147 191 198 223 183 185
# ci 137 91 68 29 11 10 114 89 75 23 9 4
# to 203 216 195 231 243 277 239 220 227 254 308 311
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Figure 238: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 213 270 320 216 160 147 174 302 325 247 193 191
# ci 287 230 165 146 114 114 326 198 152 129 91 89
# to 0 0 15 138 203 239 0 0 23 124 216 220
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 199 322 365 273 237 198 197 381 389 291 240 223
# ci 301 178 105 78 68 75 303 119 61 46 29 23
# to 0 0 30 149 195 227 0 0 50 163 231 254
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 250 408 387 282 246 183 280 394 343 285 213 185
# ci 250 92 43 18 11 9 220 106 37 14 10 4
# to 0 0 70 200 243 308 0 0 120 201 277 311
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B.6.1. Computational Costs
Figure 239: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 36,79
seconds.
Figure 240: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 77,9 seconds.
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Figure 241: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 77,9 seconds.
Figure 242: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
48,67 seconds.
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Figure 243: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 36,79 seconds.
Figure 244: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 43,14 seconds.
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B.7. Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 245: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 43 77 101 128 151 151 136 206 240 280 270 301
# ci 457 423 399 372 349 349 364 294 260 220 230 199
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 227 239 222 221 191 189 47 57 66 73 66 61
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 273 261 278 279 309 311 453 443 434 427 434 439
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 11 16 16 16 17 24 5 4 9 11 11 8
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 489 484 484 484 483 476 495 496 491 489 489 492
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Figure 246: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 43 136 227 47 11 5 77 206 239 57 16 4
# ci 457 364 0 0 0 0 423 294 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 273 453 489 495 0 0 261 443 484 496
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 101 240 222 66 16 9 128 280 221 73 16 11
# ci 399 260 0 0 0 0 372 220 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 278 434 484 491 0 0 279 427 484 489
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 151 270 191 66 17 11 151 301 189 61 24 8
# ci 349 230 0 0 0 0 349 199 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 309 434 483 489 0 0 311 439 476 492
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Figure 247: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 22 53 76 100 120 114 93 114 148 155 187 192
# ci 478 447 424 400 380 386 407 386 352 345 313 308
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 113 136 132 108 109 86 35 26 30 25 25 32
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 387 364 368 392 391 414 465 474 470 475 475 468
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 20 11 15 13 6 6 5 5 3 1 3 2
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 480 489 485 487 494 494 495 495 497 499 497 498
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Figure 248: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 22 93 113 35 20 5 53 114 136 26 11 5
# ci 478 407 0 0 0 0 447 386 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 387 465 480 495 0 0 364 474 489 495
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 76 148 132 30 15 3 100 155 108 25 13 1
# ci 424 352 0 0 0 0 400 345 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 368 470 485 497 0 0 392 475 487 499
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 120 187 109 25 6 3 114 192 86 32 6 2
# ci 38 313 0 0 0 0 386 308 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 391 475 494 497 0 0 414 468 494 498
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B.7.1. Computational Costs
Figure 249: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is
164,65 seconds.
Figure 250: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 36,09 seconds.
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Figure 251: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 164,65 seconds.
Figure 252: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
155,73 seconds.
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Figure 253: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 36,83 seconds.
Figure 254: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 155,73 seconds.
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B.8. Destructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 255: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 316 312 320 340 312 429 465 480 486 487 484
# ci 212 184 188 180 160 188 71 35 20 14 13 16
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 486 496 500 499 498 499 353 438 478 494 494 495
# ci 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 10 4 0 1 2 1 146 62 22 6 6 5
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 244 349 417 462 465 472 244 325 379 406 426 446
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 256 151 83 38 35 28 256 175 121 94 74 54
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Figure 256: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 429 486 353 244 244 316 465 496 438 349 325
# ci 212 71 4 1 0 0 184 35 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 10 146 256 256 0 0 4 62 151 175
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 312 480 500 478 417 379 320 486 499 494 462 406
# ci 188 20 0 0 0 0 180 14 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 22 83 121 0 0 1 6 38 94
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 340 487 498 494 465 426 312 484 499 495 472 446
# ci 160 13 0 0 0 0 188 16 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 2 6 35 74 0 0 1 5 28 54
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Figure 257: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 213 174 199 197 250 280 270 302 322 381 408 394
# ci 287 326 301 303 250 220 230 198 178 119 92 106
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 319 324 365 389 387 343 216 247 273 291 282 284
# ci 165 152 105 61 43 37 146 129 78 46 18 14
# to 16 24 30 50 70 120 138 124 149 163 200 202
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 160 193 237 240 245 213 147 191 198 223 183 185
# ci 137 91 68 29 11 10 114 89 75 23 9 4
# to 203 216 195 231 244 277 239 220 227 254 308 311
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Figure 258: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 213 270 319 216 160 147 174 302 324 247 193 191
# ci 287 230 165 146 137 114 326 198 152 129 91 89
# to 0 0 16 138 203 239 0 0 24 124 216 220
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 199 322 365 273 237 198 197 381 389 291 240 223
# ci 301 178 105 78 68 75 303 119 61 46 29 23
# to 0 0 30 149 195 227 0 0 50 163 231 254
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 250 408 387 282 245 183 280 394 343 284 213 185
# ci 250 92 43 18 11 9 220 106 37 14 10 4
# to 0 0 70 200 244 308 0 0 120 202 277 311
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B.8.1. Computational Costs
Figure 259: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 75,81
seconds.
Figure 260: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 36,71 seconds.
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Figure 261: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 75,81 seconds.
Figure 262: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
122,89 seconds.
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Figure 263: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 10,36 seconds.
Figure 264: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 120,28 seconds.
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B.9. Constructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 265: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 34 77 87 118 122 131 64 148 177 218 225 237
# ci 466 423 413 382 378 369 436 352 323 282 275 263
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 139 250 268 283 266 254 61 104 121 132 122 125
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 361 250 232 217 234 246 439 396 379 368 378 375
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 20 32 50 49 51 63 3 11 16 29 33 24
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 480 468 450 451 449 437 497 489 484 471 467 476
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Figure 266: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 34 64 139 61 20 3 77 148 250 104 32 11
# ci 466 436 0 0 0 0 423 352 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 361 439 480 497 0 0 250 396 468 489
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 87 177 268 121 50 16 118 218 283 132 49 29
# ci 413 323 0 0 0 0 382 282 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 232 379 450 484 0 0 217 368 451 471
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 122 225 266 122 51 33 131 237 254 125 63 24
# ci 378 275 0 0 0 0 369 263 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 234 378 449 467 0 0 246 375 437 476
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Figure 267: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 25 36 55 68 87 88 52 74 84 106 111 122
# ci 475 464 445 432 413 412 448 426 416 394 389 378
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 60 103 105 109 105 104 21 45 53 45 29 28
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 440 397 395 391 395 396 479 455 447 455 471 472
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 18 14 15 19 22 21 9 7 7 7 9 9
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 482 486 485 481 478 479 491 493 493 493 491 491
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Figure 268: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 25 52 60 21 18 9 36 74 103 45 14 7
# ci 475 448 0 0 0 0 464 426 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 440 479 482 491 0 0 397 455 486 493
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 55 84 105 53 15 7 68 106 109 45 19 7
# ci 445 416 0 0 0 0 432 394 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 395 447 485 493 0 0 391 455 481 493
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 87 111 105 29 22 9 88 122 104 28 21 9
# ci 413 389 0 0 0 0 412 378 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 395 471 478 491 0 0 396 472 479 491
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B.9.1. Computational Costs
Figure 269: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 154,23 seconds.
Figure 270: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 22,8
seconds.
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Figure 271: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is
154,23 seconds.
Figure 272: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 128,41 seconds.
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Figure 273: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
22,56 seconds.
Figure 274: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
128,41 seconds.
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B.10. Destructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 275: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 299 286 290 312 288 418 446 467 478 486 478
# ci 212 201 214 210 188 212 82 54 33 22 14 22
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 490 498 500 499 500 499 378 451 480 492 494 488
# ci 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 6 2 0 1 0 1 121 49 20 8 6 12
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 256 356 406 451 461 464 232 317 369 386 407 419
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 244 144 94 49 39 36 268 183 131 114 93 81
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Figure 276: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 418 490 378 256 232 299 446 498 451 356 317
# ci 212 82 4 1 0 0 201 54 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 6 121 244 268 0 0 2 49 144 183
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 286 467 500 480 406 369 290 478 499 492 451 386
# ci 214 33 0 0 0 0 210 22 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 20 94 131 0 0 1 8 49 114
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 312 486 500 494 461 407 288 478 499 488 464 419
# ci 188 14 0 0 0 0 212 22 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 6 39 93 0 0 1 12 36 81
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Figure 277: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 213 169 193 193 246 271 264 293 317 373 404 389
# ci 287 331 307 307 254 229 236 207 183 127 96 111
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 330 339 382 418 411 379 231 258 290 306 295 290
# ci 165 152 105 61 43 37 146 129 78 46 18 14
# to 5 9 13 21 46 84 123 113 132 148 187 196
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 169 193 240 236 239 208 146 179 182 208 168 158
# ci 137 91 68 29 11 10 114 89 75 23 9 4
# to 194 216 192 250 250 282 240 232 243 269 323 338
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Figure 278: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 213 264 330 231 169 146 169 293 339 258 193 179
# ci 287 236 165 146 137 114 331 207 152 129 91 89
# to 0 0 5 123 194 240 0 0 9 113 216 232
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 193 317 382 290 240 182 193 373 418 306 236 208
# ci 307 183 105 78 68 75 307 127 61 46 29 23
# to 0 0 13 132 192 243 0 0 21 148 235 269
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 246 404 411 295 239 168 271 389 379 290 208 158
# ci 254 96 43 18 11 9 229 111 37 14 10 4
# to 0 0 46 187 250 323 0 0 84 196 282 338
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B.10.1. Computational Costs
Figure 279: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 43,52 seconds.
Figure 280: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is
22,78 seconds.
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Figure 281: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 43,52
seconds.
Figure 282: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 80,81 seconds.
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Figure 283: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
7,23 seconds.
Figure 284: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
78,82 seconds.
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B.11. Constructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 285: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 29 78 95 111 126 127 69 174 171 211 212 226
# ci 471 422 405 389 374 373 431 326 329 289 288 274
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 138 247 267 281 251 237 44 111 120 115 134 122
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 362 253 233 219 249 263 456 389 380 385 366 378
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 13 45 65 52 60 46 6 18 16 29 33 24
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 487 455 435 448 440 454 494 482 484 471 467 476
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Figure 286: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 29 69 138 44 13 6 78 174 247 111 45 18
# ci 471 431 0 0 0 0 422 326 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 362 456 487 494 0 0 253 389 455 482
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 95 171 267 120 65 16 111 211 281 115 52 29
# ci 405 329 0 0 0 0 389 289 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 233 380 435 484 0 0 219 385 448 471
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 126 212 251 134 60 33 127 226 237 122 46 24
# ci 374 288 0 0 0 0 373 274 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 249 366 440 467 0 0 263 378 454 476
218
Figure 287: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 19 43 58 79 87 82 51 73 84 98 120 125
# ci 481 457 442 421 413 418 449 427 416 402 380 375
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 71 104 101 118 104 103 25 46 51 61 43 23
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 429 396 399 382 396 397 475 454 449 439 457 477
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 13 11 14 27 20 15 7 10 9 7 10 5
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 487 489 486 473 480 485 493 490 491 493 490 495
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Figure 288: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 19 51 71 25 13 7 43 73 104 46 11 10
# ci 481 449 0 0 0 0 457 427 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 429 475 487 493 0 0 396 454 489 490
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 58 84 101 51 14 9 79 98 118 61 27 7
# ci 442 416 0 0 0 0 421 402 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 399 449 486 491 0 0 382 439 473 493
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 87 120 104 43 20 10 82 125 103 23 15 5
# ci 413 380 0 0 0 0 418 375 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 396 457 480 490 0 0 397 477 485 495
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B.11.1. Computational Costs
Figure 289: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 152,45 seconds.
Figure 290: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 23,19
seconds.
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Figure 291: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is
152,45 seconds.
Figure 292: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 140,93 seconds.
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Figure 293: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
22,53 seconds.
Figure 294: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
140,93 seconds.
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B.12. Destructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 295: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 299 286 290 312 288 400 427 467 474 485 478
# ci 212 201 214 210 188 212 100 73 33 26 15 22
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 479 494 499 499 500 499 355 434 472 487 493 486
# ci 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 17 6 1 1 0 1 144 66 28 13 7 14
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 235 340 397 445 456 459 223 304 359 379 401 413
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 265 160 103 55 44 41 277 196 141 121 99 87
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Figure 296: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 400 479 355 235 223 299 427 494 434 340 304
# ci 212 10 4 1 0 0 201 73 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 17 144 265 277 0 0 6 66 160 196
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 286 467 499 472 397 359 290 474 499 487 445 379
# ci 214 33 0 0 0 0 210 26 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 1 28 103 141 0 0 1 13 55 121
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 312 485 500 493 456 401 288 478 499 486 459 413
# ci 188 15 0 0 0 0 212 22 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 7 44 99 0 0 1 14 41 87
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Figure 297: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 213 169 193 193 246 271 256 286 316 373 404 389
# ci 287 331 307 307 254 229 244 214 184 127 96 111
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 316 334 380 417 411 379 216 248 276 302 293 289
# ci 165 152 105 61 43 37 146 129 78 46 18 14
# to 19 14 15 22 46 84 138 123 146 152 189 197
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 160 187 234 235 238 208 136 174 180 208 167 156
# ci 137 91 68 29 11 10 114 89 75 23 9 4
# to 203 222 198 236 251 282 250 237 245 269 324 340
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Figure 298: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 213 256 316 216 160 136 169 286 334 248 187 174
# ci 287 244 165 146 137 114 331 214 152 129 91 89
# to 0 0 19 138 203 250 0 0 14 123 222 237
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 193 316 380 276 234 180 193 373 417 302 235 208
# ci 307 184 105 78 68 75 307 127 61 46 29 23
# to 0 0 15 146 198 245 0 0 22 152 236 269
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 246 404 411 293 238 167 271 389 379 289 208 156
# ci 254 96 43 18 11 9 229 111 37 14 10 4
# to 0 0 46 189 251 324 0 0 84 197 282 340
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B.12.1. Computational Costs
Figure 299: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 44,23 seconds.
Figure 300: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is
22,47 seconds.
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Figure 301: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 44,23
seconds.
Figure 302: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 80,1 seconds.
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Figure 303: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
7,15 seconds.
Figure 304: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is
78,09 seconds.
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B.13. Constructive Control by Adding Voters
Figure 305: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding voters. Number of
candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 87 159 280 409 481 497 71 124 280 357 461 485
# ci 413 341 220 7 0 0 429 376 220 6 0 0
# to 0 0 0 84 19 3 0 0 0 137 39 15
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 44 80 208 308 429 490 15 59 163 261 410 479
# ci 456 420 292 21 0 0 485 441 337 35 0 0
# to 0 0 0 171 71 10 0 0 0 204 90 21
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 12 42 121 197 359 479 9 20 103 146 324 457
# ci 488 458 377 72 1 0 491 480 232 94 2 0
# to 0 0 2 231 140 21 0 0 165 260 174 43
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Figure 306: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding voters. Number of
voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 87 71 44 15 12 9 159 124 80 59 42 20
# ci 413 429 456 485 488 491 341 376 420 441 458 480
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 280 280 208 163 121 103 409 357 308 261 197 146
# ci 220 220 292 337 377 232 7 6 21 35 72 94
# to 0 0 0 0 2 165 84 137 171 204 231 260
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 481 461 429 410 359 324 497 489 490 479 479 457
# ci 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 19 39 71 90 140 174 3 11 10 21 21 43
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Figure 307: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding voters. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 64 84 159 175 190 203 57 66 92 113 133 142
# ci 436 416 341 203 231 229 443 434 408 302 296 298
# to 0 0 0 122 79 68 0 0 0 85 71 60
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 23 45 69 79 85 139 15 30 30 58 51 80
# ci 477 455 431 357 352 314 485 470 470 390 391 376
# to 0 0 0 64 63 47 0 0 0 52 58 44
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 10 11 28 26 40 53 3 5 12 11 22 21
# ci 490 489 472 422 403 406 497 495 442 438 442 442
# to 0 0 0 52 57 41 0 0 46 51 36 37
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Figure 308: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding voters. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 64 57 23 15 10 3 84 66 45 30 11 5
# ci 436 443 477 485 490 497 416 434 455 470 489 495
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 159 92 69 30 28 12 175 113 79 58 26 11
# ci 341 408 431 470 472 442 203 302 357 390 422 438
# to 0 0 0 0 0 46 122 85 64 52 52 51
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 190 133 85 51 40 22 203 142 139 80 53 21
# ci 231 296 352 391 403 442 229 298 314 376 406 442
# to 79 71 63 58 57 36 68 60 47 44 41 37
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B.13.1. Computational Costs
Figure 309: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding voters in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 106,7 seconds.
Figure 310: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding
voters in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 242,32 seconds.
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Figure 311: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
voters in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 184,92 seconds.
Figure 312: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding voters in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 29,3 seconds.
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Figure 313: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding
voters in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 66,06 seconds.
Figure 314: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
voters in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 62,9 seconds.
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B.14. Constructive Control by Deleting Voters
Figure 315: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting voters. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 88 214 346 441 484 497 73 140 323 394 467 499
# ci 412 286 154 10 0 0 427 360 177 7 0 0
# to 0 0 0 49 16 3 0 0 0 99 33 1
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 47 100 244 369 404 484 32 70 178 266 366 478
# ci 453 400 256 14 0 0 468 430 322 40 0 0
# to 0 0 0 117 96 16 0 0 0 194 134 22
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 15 34 139 197 309 414 10 25 90 144 262 417
# ci 485 466 357 58 2 0 490 475 253 93 2 0
# to 0 0 4 245 189 86 0 0 157 263 236 83
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Figure 316: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting voters. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 88 73 47 32 15 10 214 140 100 70 34 25
# ci 412 427 453 468 485 490 286 360 400 430 466 475
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 346 323 244 178 139 90 441 394 369 266 197 144
# ci 154 177 256 322 357 253 10 7 14 40 58 93
# to 0 0 0 0 4 157 49 99 117 194 245 263
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 484 467 404 366 309 262 497 499 484 478 414 417
# ci 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 16 33 96 134 189 236 3 1 16 22 86 83
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Figure 317: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting voters. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 75 131 190 209 176 192 45 76 126 129 140 162
# ci 425 369 310 216 222 227 455 424 374 298 283 275
# to 0 0 0 75 102 81 0 0 0 73 77 63
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 27 42 77 84 85 101 21 26 45 49 64 68
# ci 473 458 423 351 342 330 479 474 394 403 386 368
# to 0 0 0 65 73 66 0 0 61 48 5 64
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 10 12 28 25 33 46 5 7 10 12 20 23
# ci 490 488 427 430 410 408 495 493 443 445 439 443
# to 0 0 45 45 57 46 0 0 47 43 41 34
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Figure 318: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting voters. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 75 45 27 21 10 5 131 76 42 26 12 7
# ci 425 455 473 479 490 495 369 424 458 474 488 493
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 190 126 77 45 28 10 209 129 84 49 25 12
# ci 310 374 423 394 427 443 216 298 351 403 430 445
# to 0 0 0 61 45 47 75 73 65 48 45 43
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 176 140 85 64 33 20 192 162 101 68 46 23
# ci 222 283 342 386 410 439 227 275 333 368 408 443
# to 102 77 73 50 57 41 81 63 66 64 46 34
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B.14.1. Computational Costs
Figure 319: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting voters in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 46,5 seconds.
Figure 320: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
voters in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 247,02 seconds.
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Figure 321: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
voters in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 188,16 seconds.
Figure 322: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting voters in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 158,2 seconds.
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Figure 323: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
voters in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 37,76 seconds.
Figure 324: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
voters in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 35,6 seconds.
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B.15. Constructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TE
Figure 325: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 97 282 431 471 398 355 84 284 468 489 458 437
# ci 403 218 69 0 0 0 416 216 32 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 29 102 145 0 0 0 11 42 63
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 32 219 444 491 480 456 23 162 408 471 475 469
# ci 468 281 0 0 0 0 477 338 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 56 9 20 44 0 0 92 29 25 31
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 12 87 322 429 471 471 9 41 239 380 465 476
# ci 488 413 0 0 0 0 491 459 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 178 71 29 29 0 0 261 120 35 24
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Figure 326: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 97 84 32 23 12 9 282 284 219 162 87 41
# ci 403 416 468 477 488 491 218 216 281 338 413 459
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 431 468 444 408 322 239 471 489 491 471 429 380
# ci 69 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 56 92 178 261 29 11 9 29 71 120
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 398 458 480 475 471 465 355 437 456 469 471 476
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 102 42 20 25 29 35 145 63 44 31 29 24
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Figure 327: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 54 130 142 149 128 158 45 86 145 120 120 125
# ci 446 370 358 189 159 115 455 414 355 106 84 67
# to 0 0 0 162 213 227 0 0 0 274 296 308
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 17 51 117 81 99 115 15 36 66 58 75 79
# ci 483 449 97 54 26 34 485 464 63 35 14 18
# to 0 0 286 365 375 351 0 0 371 407 411 403
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 21 49 28 46 57 6 5 28 17 25 45
# ci 500 479 60 28 5 8 494 495 40 20 6 0
# to 0 0 392 444 449 435 0 0 432 463 469 455
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Figure 328: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 54 45 17 15 0 6 130 86 51 36 21 5
# ci 446 455 483 485 500 494 370 414 449 464 479 495
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 142 145 117 66 49 28 149 120 81 58 28 17
# ci 358 355 97 63 60 40 189 106 54 35 28 20
# to 0 0 286 371 392 432 162 274 365 407 444 463
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 128 120 99 75 46 25 158 125 115 79 57 45
# ci 159 84 26 14 5 6 115 67 34 18 8 0
# to 213 296 375 411 449 469 227 308 351 403 435 455
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B.15.1. Computational Costs
Figure 329: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control
by partition of voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 47
seconds.
Figure 330: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 475,79 seconds.
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Figure 331: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 47 seconds.
Figure 332: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 57,39
seconds.
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Figure 333: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 274,43 seconds.
Figure 334: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 203,24 seconds.
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B.16. Destructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TE
Figure 335: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 339 403 480 464 351 319 427 479 496 494 444 424
# ci 161 97 20 6 0 0 73 21 4 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 30 149 181 0 0 0 6 56 76
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 476 488 499 497 479 465 478 496 500 499 488 473
# ci 2 12 0 0 0 0 22 4 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 1 3 21 35 0 0 0 1 12 27
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 491 500 500 499 492 485 498 500 500 500 492 485
# ci 9 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 1 8 15 0 0 0 0 8 15
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Figure 336: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 339 427 476 478 491 498 403 479 488 496 500 500
# ci 161 73 24 22 9 2 97 21 12 4 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 480 496 499 500 500 500 464 494 497 499 499 500
# ci 20 4 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 1 0 0 0 30 6 3 1 1 0
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 351 444 479 488 492 492 319 424 465 473 485 485
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 149 56 21 12 8 8 181 76 35 27 15 15
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Figure 337: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 203 208 230 216 199 205 261 280 321 352 303 288
# ci 297 292 270 205 170 120 239 220 179 92 83 69
# to 0 0 0 79 131 175 0 0 0 56 114 143
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 326 337 374 390 352 328 350 367 402 432 409 365
# ci 174 163 94 66 35 30 150 133 82 25 13 19
# to 0 0 32 44 113 142 0 0 16 43 78 116
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 361 371 415 443 416 379 363 381 443 438 408 365
# ci 139 129 71 27 8 6 137 119 45 24 4 5
# to 0 0 14 30 76 115 0 0 12 38 88 130
254
Figure 338: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 203 261 326 350 361 363 208 280 337 367 371 381
# ci 297 239 174 150 139 137 292 220 163 133 129 119
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 230 321 374 402 415 443 216 352 390 432 443 438
# ci 270 179 94 82 71 45 205 92 66 25 27 24
# to 0 0 32 16 14 12 79 56 44 43 30 38
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 199 303 352 409 416 408 205 288 328 365 379 365
# ci 170 83 35 13 8 4 120 69 3 19 6 5
# to 131 114 113 78 76 88 175 143 142 116 115 130
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B.16.1. Computational Costs
Figure 339: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 22,15
seconds.
Figure 340: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 325,26 seconds.
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Figure 341: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 21,87 seconds.
Figure 342: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 17,19
seconds.
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Figure 343: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 57,94 seconds.
Figure 344: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TE in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 24,63 seconds.
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B.17. Constructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TP
Figure 345: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 49 151 231 239 199 139 34 158 331 331 246 204
# ci 451 349 269 0 0 0 466 342 53 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 261 301 361 0 0 116 169 254 296
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 19 154 307 362 283 196 20 108 287 357 263 208
# ci 481 346 0 0 0 0 480 392 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 193 138 217 304 0 0 213 143 237 292
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 11 80 245 319 281 199 5 38 183 279 269 222
# ci 489 420 0 0 0 0 495 462 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 255 181 219 301 0 0 317 221 231 278
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Figure 346: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 49 34 19 20 11 5 151 158 154 108 80 38
# ci 451 466 481 480 489 495 349 342 346 392 420 462
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 231 331 307 287 245 183 239 331 362 357 319 279
# ci 269 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 116 193 213 255 317 261 169 138 143 181 221
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 199 246 283 263 281 269 139 204 196 208 199 222
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 301 254 217 237 219 231 361 296 304 292 301 278
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Figure 347: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 28 91 93 109 100 104 25 67 113 84 80 88
# ci 472 409 407 189 159 151 475 433 319 106 84 67
# to 0 0 0 202 241 281 0 0 68 310 336 345
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 18 45 100 45 53 66 12 30 67 40 42 63
# ci 482 455 97 54 26 34 488 470 63 35 14 18
# to 0 0 303 401 421 400 0 0 370 425 444 419
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 2 19 37 24 24 28 1 13 22 7 12 20
# ci 498 481 60 28 5 8 499 487 40 20 6 0
# to 0 0 403 448 471 464 0 0 438 473 482 480
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Figure 348: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 28 25 18 12 2 1 91 67 45 30 19 13
# ci 472 475 482 488 498 499 409 433 455 470 481 487
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 93 113 100 67 37 22 109 84 45 40 24 7
# ci 407 319 97 63 40 4 189 106 54 35 28 20
# to 0 68 303 370 438 438 202 310 401 425 448 473
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 100 80 53 42 24 12 104 88 66 63 28 20
# ci 159 84 26 14 5 6 115 67 34 18 8 0
# to 241 336 421 444 471 482 281 345 400 419 464 480
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B.17.1. Computational Costs
Figure 349: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 71,61
seconds.
Figure 350: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 588,49 seconds.
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Figure 351: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 259,19 seconds.
Figure 352: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 76,56
seconds.
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Figure 353: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 308,87 seconds.
Figure 354: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 243,35 seconds.
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B.18. Destructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TP
Figure 355: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 299 328 460 429 339 326 402 448 495 486 462 442
# ci 201 172 40 6 0 0 98 52 5 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 65 161 174 0 0 0 14 38 58
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 469 481 499 499 489 474 473 496 500 500 493 490
# ci 31 19 0 0 0 0 27 4 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 1 1 11 26 0 0 0 0 7 10
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 491 500 500 500 497 487 496 500 500 500 494 490
# ci 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 3 13 0 0 0 0 6 10
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Figure 356: Results for Bucklin voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 299 402 469 473 491 496 328 448 481 496 500 500
# ci 201 98 31 27 9 4 172 52 19 4 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 460 495 499 500 500 500 429 486 499 500 500 500
# ci 40 5 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 1 0 0 0 65 14 1 0 0 0
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 339 462 489 493 497 494 326 442 474 490 487 490
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 161 38 11 7 3 6 174 58 26 10 13 10
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Figure 357: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 195 203 228 212 202 212 254 278 315 345 307 300
# ci 305 297 272 205 170 120 246 222 185 92 83 69
# to 0 0 0 83 128 168 0 0 0 63 110 131
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 321 336 379 386 348 337 349 364 401 424 407 377
# ci 179 164 94 66 35 30 151 136 82 25 13 19
# to 0 0 27 48 117 133 0 0 17 51 80 104
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 361 372 414 443 418 385 363 381 442 438 412 373
# ci 139 128 71 27 8 6 137 119 45 24 4 5
# to 0 0 15 30 74 109 0 0 13 38 84 122
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Figure 358: Results for Bucklin voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 195 254 321 349 361 363 203 278 336 364 372 381
# ci 305 246 179 151 139 137 297 222 164 136 128 119
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 228 315 379 401 414 442 212 345 386 424 443 438
# ci 272 185 94 82 71 45 205 92 66 25 27 24
# to 0 0 27 17 15 13 83 63 48 51 30 38
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 202 307 348 407 418 412 212 212 300 377 385 373
# ci 170 83 35 13 8 4 120 120 69 19 6 5
# to 128 110 117 80 74 84 168 168 131 104 109 122
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B.18.1. Computational Costs
Figure 359: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 26,14
seconds.
Figure 360: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 452,32 seconds.
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Figure 361: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the IC model. The maximum is 30,3 seconds.
Figure 362: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 13,68
seconds.
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Figure 363: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 89,22 seconds.
Figure 364: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in Bucklin elections in the TM model. The maximum is 36,57 seconds.
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C. Plurality Voting
C.1. Constructive Control by Adding Candidates
Figure 365: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 22 27 34 20 24 15 3 32 37 47 39 52
# ci 478 473 466 480 476 485 497 468 463 453 461 448
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 10 21 49 72 100 0 5 13 13 17 26
# ci 500 490 479 451 428 310 0 0 0 0 0 7
# to 0 0 0 0 0 90 500 495 487 437 483 467
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 0 2 6 8 5 0 0 1 0 1 1
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 500 500 498 496 492 495 500 500 499 500 499 499
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Figure 366: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by adding candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 22 3 0 0 0 0 27 32 10 5 0 0
# ci 478 497 500 0 0 0 473 468 490 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 500 500 500 0 0 0 495 500 500
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 34 37 21 13 2 1 20 47 49 13 6 0
# ci 466 463 479 0 0 0 480 453 451 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 487 498 499 0 0 0 487 494 500
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 24 39 72 17 8 1 15 52 100 26 5 1
# ci 476 461 428 0 0 0 485 448 310 7 0 0
# to 0 0 0 483 492 499 0 0 90 467 495 499
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Figure 367: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 13 17 12 9 10 3 1 6 6 5 3 1
# ci 487 483 488 491 490 497 499 494 494 495 497 499
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 3 1 0 3 6 0 0 1 0 0 1
# ci 500 497 499 500 497 487 1 0 28 452 482 485
# to 0 0 0 0 0 7 499 500 471 48 18 14
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# ci 0 0 0 6 447 491 0 0 0 0 0 456
# to 500 500 500 494 52 9 500 500 500 500 500 44
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Figure 368: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by adding candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 13 1 0 0 0 0 17 6 3 0 0 0
# ci 487 499 500 1 0 0 483 494 497 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 499 500 500 0 0 0 500 500 500
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 12 6 1 1 0 0 9 5 0 0 0 0
# ci 488 494 499 28 0 0 491 495 500 452 6 0
# to 0 0 0 471 500 500 0 0 0 48 494 500
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 10 3 3 0 1 0 3 10 6 1 0 0
# ci 490 497 497 482 447 0 497 490 487 485 491 456
# to 0 0 0 18 52 500 0 0 7 14 9 44
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C.1.1. Computational Costs
Figure 369: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 562,76 seconds.
Figure 370: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding
candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 178,74 seconds.
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Figure 371: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 562,76 seconds.
Figure 372: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
adding candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 71,66 seconds.
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Figure 373: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by adding
candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 47,64 seconds.
Figure 374: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by adding
candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 47,35 seconds.
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C.2. Destructive Control by Adding Candidates
Figure 375: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 351 356 376 364 386 380 380 417 440 450 462 466
# ci 149 144 124 136 114 120 120 83 60 50 38 34
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 394 426 445 466 493 497 379 404 435 464 470 489
# ci 106 74 55 34 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 3 121 96 65 36 30 11
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 374 398 436 450 470 473 352 393 407 448 461 460
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 126 102 64 50 30 27 148 107 93 52 39 40
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Figure 376: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by adding candidates. Number
of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 351 380 394 379 374 352 356 417 426 404 398 393
# ci 149 120 106 0 0 0 144 83 74 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 121 126 148 0 0 0 96 102 107
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 367 440 445 435 436 407 364 450 466 464 450 448
# ci 124 60 55 0 0 0 136 50 34 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 65 64 93 0 0 0 36 50 52
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 386 462 493 470 470 461 380 466 497 489 473 460
# ci 114 38 7 0 0 0 120 34 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 30 30 39 0 0 3 11 27 40
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Figure 377: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by adding candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 302 289 275 289 269 298 286 270 288 278 283 286
# ci 198 211 225 211 231 202 214 230 212 222 217 214
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 276 273 281 281 274 302 287 260 271 262 255 279
# ci 224 227 219 219 226 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 198 207 240 229 238 245 221
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 260 256 249 277 255 260 264 275 236 260 264 261
# ci 11 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0
# to 229 244 251 223 245 240 228 225 264 240 236 239
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Figure 378: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by adding candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 302 286 276 287 260 264 289 270 273 260 256 275
# ci 198 214 224 6 11 8 211 230 227 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 229 229 228 0 0 0 240 244 225
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 275 288 281 271 249 236 289 278 281 262 277 260
# ci 225 212 219 0 0 0 211 222 219 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 229 251 264 0 0 0 238 223 240
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 269 283 274 255 255 264 298 286 302 279 260 261
# ci 231 217 226 0 0 0 202 214 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 245 245 236 0 0 198 221 240 239
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C.2.1. Computational Costs
Figure 379: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
adding candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 16,32 seconds.
Figure 380: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by adding can-
didates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 356,7 seconds.
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Figure 381: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by adding
candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 16,32 seconds.
Figure 382: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
adding candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 4,23 seconds.
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Figure 383: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by adding can-
didates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 356,7 seconds.
Figure 384: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by adding
candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 287,86 seconds.
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C.3. Constructive Control by Deleting Candidates
Figure 385: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 165 139 182 193 199 199 146 151 174 194 207 209
# ci 335 361 361 307 301 301 354 349 326 306 293 291
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 176 251 303 298 317 328 124 218 223 252 220 215
# ci 324 249 197 202 183 172 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 376 282 277 248 280 285
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 66 108 123 110 107 86 31 35 47 42 34 27
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 434 392 377 390 393 414 469 465 453 458 466 473
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Figure 386: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 165 146 176 124 66 31 139 151 251 218 108 35
# ci 335 354 324 0 0 0 361 349 249 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 376 434 469 0 0 0 282 392 465
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 182 174 303 223 123 47 193 194 398 252 110 42
# ci 318 326 197 0 0 0 307 306 202 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 277 377 453 0 0 0 248 390 458
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 199 207 317 220 107 34 199 209 328 215 86 27
# ci 301 293 183 0 0 0 301 291 172 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 280 393 466 0 0 0 285 414 473
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Figure 387: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting candidates.
Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 149 163 172 188 173 183 124 159 161 163 162 173
# ci 351 337 328 312 327 317 376 341 339 337 338 327
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 161 166 198 186 201 184 124 131 162 165 185 164
# ci 339 334 302 314 299 316 1 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 375 369 338 335 315 336
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 117 149 164 171 140 157 110 168 151 143 137 156
# ci 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 382 351 336 329 360 343 390 332 349 357 363 344
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Figure 388: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by deleting candidates.
Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 149 124 161 124 117 110 163 159 166 131 149 168
# ci 351 376 339 1 1 0 337 341 334 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 375 382 390 0 0 0 369 351 332
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 172 161 198 162 164 151 188 163 186 165 171 143
# ci 328 339 302 0 0 0 312 337 314 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 338 336 349 0 0 0 335 329 357
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 173 162 201 185 140 137 183 173 184 164 157 156
# ci 327 338 299 0 0 0 317 327 316 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 315 360 363 0 0 0 336 343 344
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C.3.1. Computational Costs
Figure 389: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 153,26 seconds.
Figure 390: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 283,07 seconds.
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Figure 391: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 153,26 seconds.
Figure 392: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
deleting candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 24,32 seconds.
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Figure 393: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by deleting
candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 279,1 seconds.
Figure 394: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by deleting
candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 177,03 seconds.
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C.4. Destructive Control by Deleting Candidates
Figure 395: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 220 218 208 217 243 224 239 334 374 404 415 420
# ci 280 282 292 283 257 276 261 166 126 96 85 80
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 336 467 483 488 497 497 245 471 469 485 485 487
# ci 164 33 17 12 3 3 11 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 244 29 31 15 15 13
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 90 461 465 478 475 474 34 284 454 457 474 444
# ci 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
# to 405 39 35 22 25 26 463 216 46 43 26 56
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Figure 396: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 220 239 336 245 90 34 218 334 467 471 461 284
# ci 280 261 164 11 5 3 282 166 33 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 244 405 463 0 0 0 29 39 216
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 208 374 483 469 465 454 217 404 488 485 478 457
# ci 292 126 17 0 0 0 283 96 12 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 31 35 46 0 0 0 15 22 43
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 243 415 497 485 475 474 224 420 497 487 474 444
# ci 257 85 3 0 0 0 276 80 3 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 15 25 26 0 0 0 13 26 56
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Figure 397: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 145 93 80 95 73 80 143 125 117 131 145 130
# ci 355 407 420 405 427 420 357 375 383 369 355 370
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 249 193 190 199 182 195 161 145 156 138 122 126
# ci 251 307 310 301 318 305 192 141 66 41 19 17
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 147 214 278 321 359 357
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 44 70 79 77 87 95 20 43 33 56 30 25
# ci 169 122 77 28 10 4 177 106 43 25 5 3
# to 287 308 344 395 403 401 303 351 424 419 465 472
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Figure 398: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by deleting candidates. Num-
ber of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 145 143 249 161 44 20 93 125 193 145 70 43
# ci 355 357 251 192 169 177 407 375 307 141 122 106
# to 0 0 0 147 287 303 0 0 0 214 308 351
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 80 117 190 156 79 33 95 131 199 138 77 56
# ci 420 383 310 66 77 43 405 369 301 41 28 25
# to 0 0 0 278 344 424 0 0 0 321 395 419
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 73 145 182 122 87 30 80 130 195 126 95 25
# ci 427 355 318 19 10 5 420 370 305 17 4 3
# to 0 0 0 359 403 465 0 0 0 357 401 472
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C.4.1. Computational Costs
Figure 399: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
deleting candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 100,99 seconds.
Figure 400: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by deleting
candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 283,09 seconds.
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Figure 401: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by deleting
candidates in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 96,65 seconds.
Figure 402: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
deleting candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 137,95 seconds.
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Figure 403: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by deleting
candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 247,8 seconds.
Figure 404: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by deleting
candidates in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 160,46 seconds.
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C.5. Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 405: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 23 60 115 100 122 139 98 164 254 268 298 314
# ci 477 440 385 400 378 361 402 336 246 232 202 186
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 102 208 235 204 210 181 12 37 45 47 68 67
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 398 292 265 296 290 319 488 463 455 453 432 433
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 5 5 14 22 23 0 3 3 5 5 8
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 500 495 495 486 478 477 500 497 497 495 495 492
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Figure 406: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 23 98 102 12 0 0 60 164 208 37 5 3
# ci 477 402 0 0 0 0 440 336 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 398 488 500 500 0 0 292 463 495 497
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 115 254 235 45 5 3 100 268 204 47 14 5
# ci 385 246 0 0 0 0 400 232 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 265 455 495 497 0 0 296 453 486 495
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 122 298 210 68 22 5 139 314 181 67 23 8
# ci 378 202 0 0 0 0 361 186 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 290 432 478 495 0 0 319 433 477 492
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Figure 407: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates
in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 6 21 35 43 54 57 15 47 70 69 101 93
# ci 494 479 465 457 446 443 485 453 430 431 399 407
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 29 62 53 43 46 34 3 12 8 15 17 8
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 471 438 447 457 454 466 497 488 492 485 483 492
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 2 1 4 2 4 2 0 0 3 2 2 1
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 498 499 496 498 496 498 500 500 497 498 498 499
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Figure 408: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates
in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 6 15 29 3 2 0 21 47 62 12 1 0
# ci 494 485 0 0 0 0 479 453 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 471 497 498 500 0 0 438 488 499 500
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 35 70 53 8 4 3 43 69 43 15 2 2
# ci 465 430 0 0 0 0 457 431 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 447 492 496 497 0 0 457 485 498 498
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 54 101 46 17 4 2 57 93 34 8 2 1
# ci 446 399 0 0 0 0 443 407 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 454 483 496 498 0 0 466 492 498 499
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C.5.1. Computational Costs
Figure 409: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
158,73 seconds.
Figure 410: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 27,99 seconds.
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Figure 411: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 158,11 seconds.
Figure 412: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
188,89 seconds.
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Figure 413: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 27,64 seconds.
Figure 414: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 188,89 seconds.
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C.6. Destructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 415: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 282 290 293 308 294 379 445 459 477 476 485
# ci 212 218 210 207 192 206 121 55 41 23 24 15
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 394 485 494 498 498 499 19 332 375 444 473 485
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0
# to 106 15 6 2 2 1 470 168 125 56 27 15
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 2 133 343 367 411 432 2 43 266 293 352 395
# ci 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
# to 493 367 157 133 89 68 495 457 234 207 148 105
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Figure 416: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 379 394 19 2 2 282 445 485 332 133 43
# ci 212 121 0 11 5 3 218 55 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 106 470 493 495 0 0 15 168 367 457
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 290 459 494 375 343 266 293 477 498 444 367 293
# ci 210 41 0 0 0 0 207 23 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 6 125 157 234 0 0 2 56 133 207
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 308 476 498 473 411 352 294 485 499 485 432 395
# ci 192 24 0 0 0 0 206 15 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 2 27 89 148 0 0 1 15 68 105
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Figure 417: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 188 147 130 137 116 122 234 200 230 232 260 230
# ci 312 353 370 363 384 378 266 300 270 268 240 270
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 295 244 242 243 217 237 29 57 74 88 91 97
# ci 161 154 105 70 39 36 192 141 66 41 19 17
# to 44 102 153 187 244 227 279 302 360 371 390 386
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 10 33 34 47 58 58 12 29 13 31 31 34
# ci 169 122 77 28 10 4 177 106 43 25 5 3
# to 321 345 389 425 432 438 311 365 444 444 464 463
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Figure 418: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 188 234 295 29 10 12 147 200 244 57 33 29
# ci 312 266 161 192 169 177 353 300 154 141 122 106
# to 0 0 44 279 321 311 0 0 102 302 345 365
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 130 230 242 74 34 13 137 232 243 88 47 31
# ci 370 270 105 66 77 43 363 268 70 41 28 25
# to 0 0 153 360 389 444 0 0 187 371 425 444
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 116 260 217 91 58 0 122 230 237 97 58 34
# ci 384 240 39 19 10 0 378 270 36 17 4 3
# to 0 0 244 390 432 0 0 0 227 386 438 463
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C.6.1. Computational Costs
Figure 419: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
172,19 seconds.
Figure 420: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 28,26 seconds.
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Figure 421: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 172,19 seconds.
Figure 422: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
115,89 seconds.
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Figure 423: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 20,15 seconds.
Figure 424: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 97,65 seconds.
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C.7. Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 425: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 17 54 120 100 132 147 82 164 241 246 275 318
# ci 483 446 380 400 368 353 418 336 259 254 225 182
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 90 219 254 231 212 202 18 42 45 56 57 57
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 410 281 246 269 288 298 482 458 455 444 443 443
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 4 8 12 15 23 17 0 1 3 3 10 7
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 496 492 488 485 477 483 500 499 497 497 490 493
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Figure 426: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 17 82 90 18 4 0 54 164 219 42 8 1
# ci 483 418 0 0 0 0 446 336 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 410 482 496 500 0 0 281 458 492 499
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 120 241 254 45 12 3 100 246 231 56 15 3
# ci 380 259 0 0 0 0 400 254 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 246 455 488 497 0 0 269 444 485 497
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 132 275 212 57 23 10 147 318 202 57 17 7
# ci 368 225 0 0 0 0 353 182 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 288 443 477 490 0 0 298 443 483 493
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Figure 427: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates
in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 7 23 35 35 46 66 21 48 77 69 99 117
# ci 493 477 465 465 454 434 479 452 423 431 401 383
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 26 54 48 49 48 48 2 13 6 14 14 4
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 474 446 452 451 452 452 498 487 494 486 486 496
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 2 3 6 2 2 0 0 0 1 2 2
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 500 498 497 494 498 498 500 500 500 499 498 498
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Figure 428: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of candidates
in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 7 21 26 2 0 0 23 48 54 13 2 0
# ci 493 479 0 0 0 0 477 452 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 474 498 500 500 0 0 446 487 498 500
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 35 77 48 6 3 0 40 69 49 14 6 1
# ci 465 423 0 0 0 0 460 431 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 452 494 497 500 0 0 451 486 494 499
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 46 99 48 14 2 2 66 117 48 4 2 2
# ci 454 401 0 0 0 0 434 383 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 452 486 498 498 0 0 452 496 498 498
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C.7.1. Computational Costs
Figure 429: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
174,14 seconds.
Figure 430: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 27,68 seconds.
319
Figure 431: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 174,14 seconds.
Figure 432: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
294,18 seconds.
320
Figure 433: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 28,05 seconds.
Figure 434: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 294,18 seconds.
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C.8. Destructive Control by Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 435: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 282 290 293 308 294 379 445 459 477 476 485
# ci 212 218 210 207 192 206 121 55 41 23 24 15
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 393 484 494 498 498 499 19 332 375 444 473 485
# ci 28 2 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0
# to 79 14 6 2 2 1 470 168 125 56 27 15
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 2 133 343 367 411 432 2 43 266 293 352 395
# ci 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
# to 493 367 157 133 89 68 495 457 234 207 148 105
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Figure 436: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 379 393 19 2 2 282 445 484 332 133 43
# ci 212 121 28 11 5 3 218 55 2 0 0 0
# to 0 0 79 470 493 495 0 0 14 168 367 457
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 290 459 494 375 343 266 293 477 498 444 367 293
# ci 210 41 0 0 0 0 207 23 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 6 125 157 234 0 0 2 56 133 207
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 308 476 498 473 411 352 294 485 499 485 432 395
# ci 192 24 0 0 0 0 206 15 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 2 27 89 148 0 0 1 15 68 105
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Figure 437: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 188 147 130 137 116 122 234 200 230 232 260 230
# ci 312 353 370 363 384 378 266 300 270 268 240 270
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 295 244 242 243 217 237 29 57 74 88 91 97
# ci 161 154 105 70 39 36 192 141 66 41 19 17
# to 44 102 153 187 244 227 279 302 360 371 390 386
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 10 33 34 47 58 58 12 29 13 31 31 34
# ci 169 122 77 28 10 4 177 106 43 25 5 3
# to 321 345 389 425 432 438 311 365 444 464 464 463
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Figure 438: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of candidates in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 188 234 295 29 10 12 147 200 244 57 33 29
# ci 312 266 161 192 169 177 353 300 154 141 122 106
# to 0 0 44 279 321 311 0 0 102 302 345 365
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 130 230 242 74 34 13 137 232 243 88 47 31
# ci 370 270 105 66 77 43 363 268 70 41 28 25
# to 0 0 153 360 389 444 0 0 187 371 425 444
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 116 260 217 91 58 31 122 230 237 97 58 34
# ci 384 240 39 19 10 5 378 270 36 17 4 3
# to 0 0 244 390 432 464 0 0 227 386 438 463
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C.8.1. Computational Costs
Figure 439: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
174,36 seconds.
Figure 440: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 28,46 seconds.
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Figure 441: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 162,76 seconds.
Figure 442: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
117,3 seconds.
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Figure 443: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 20,17 seconds.
Figure 444: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 96,35 seconds.
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C.9. Constructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 445: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 17 35 103 91 112 131 71 109 192 194 230 249
# ci 483 465 397 409 388 369 429 391 308 306 270 251
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 74 223 310 310 321 301 11 79 124 160 167 152
# ci 426 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 277 190 190 179 199 489 421 376 340 333 348
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 3 14 47 50 55 51 0 1 16 18 19 11
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 497 486 453 450 445 449 500 499 484 482 481 489
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Figure 446: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 17 71 74 11 3 0 35 109 223 79 14 1
# ci 483 429 426 0 0 0 465 391 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 489 497 500 0 0 277 421 486 499
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 103 192 310 124 47 16 91 194 310 160 50 18
# ci 397 308 0 0 0 0 409 306 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 190 376 453 484 0 0 190 340 450 482
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 112 230 321 167 55 19 131 249 301 152 51 11
# ci 388 270 0 0 0 0 369 251 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 179 333 445 481 0 0 199 348 449 489
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Figure 447: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of can-
didates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 7 21 34 46 44 66 15 43 68 65 88 95
# ci 493 479 466 454 456 434 485 457 432 435 412 405
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 21 62 64 75 75 64 3 20 26 19 19 35
# ci 88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 391 438 436 425 425 436 497 480 474 481 481 465
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 6 17 3 6 8 0 1 5 2 6 2
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 500 494 483 497 494 492 500 499 495 498 494 498
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Figure 448: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of can-
didates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 7 15 21 3 0 0 21 43 62 20 6 1
# ci 493 485 88 0 0 0 479 457 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 391 497 500 500 0 0 438 480 494 499
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 34 68 64 26 17 5 46 65 75 19 3 2
# ci 466 432 0 0 0 0 454 435 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 436 474 483 495 0 0 425 481 497 498
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 44 88 75 19 6 6 66 95 64 35 8 2
# ci 456 412 0 0 0 0 434 405 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 425 481 494 494 0 0 436 465 492 498
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C.9.1. Computational Costs
Figure 449: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 378,02 seconds.
Figure 450: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
495,26 seconds.
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Figure 451: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
430,08 seconds.
Figure 452: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 265,22 seconds.
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Figure 453: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
562,86 seconds.
Figure 454: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
469,62 seconds.
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C.10. Destructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TE
Figure 455: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 291 276 269 275 284 274 379 442 441 467 466 474
# ci 209 224 231 225 216 226 121 58 59 33 34 26
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 414 495 494 500 499 500 196 439 444 484 489 491
# ci 86 2 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 3 6 0 1 0 293 61 56 16 11 9
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 161 332 433 440 455 461 123 278 403 406 434 445
# ci 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
# to 334 168 67 60 45 39 374 222 97 94 66 55
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Figure 456: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 291 379 414 196 161 123 276 442 495 439 332 278
# ci 209 121 86 11 5 3 224 58 2 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 293 334 374 0 0 3 61 168 222
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 269 441 494 444 433 403 275 467 500 484 440 406
# ci 231 59 0 0 0 0 225 33 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 6 56 67 97 0 0 0 16 60 94
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 284 466 499 489 455 434 274 474 500 491 461 445
# ci 216 34 0 0 0 0 226 26 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 1 11 45 66 0 0 0 9 39 55
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Figure 457: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 188 144 124 129 106 115 234 197 214 218 239 219
# ci 312 356 376 371 394 385 266 303 286 282 261 281
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 305 281 276 258 257 265 130 139 138 119 119 130
# ci 195 154 105 70 39 36 192 141 66 41 19 17
# to 0 65 119 172 204 199 178 220 296 340 362 353
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 93 95 82 87 96 86 88 106 71 86 75 68
# ci 169 122 77 28 10 4 177 106 43 25 5 3
# to 238 283 341 385 394 410 235 286 386 389 420 429
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Figure 458: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TE. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 188 234 305 130 93 88 144 197 281 139 95 106
# ci 312 266 195 192 169 177 356 303 154 141 122 106
# to 0 0 0 178 238 235 0 0 65 220 283 288
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 124 214 276 138 82 71 129 218 258 119 87 86
# ci 376 286 105 66 77 43 371 282 70 41 28 25
# to 0 0 119 296 341 386 0 0 172 340 385 389
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 106 239 257 119 96 75 115 219 265 130 86 68
# ci 394 261 39 19 10 5 385 281 36 17 4 3
# to 0 0 204 362 394 420 0 0 199 353 410 429
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C.10.1. Computational Costs
Figure 459: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 35,3 seconds.
Figure 460: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
348,65 seconds.
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Figure 461: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 73,6
seconds.
Figure 462: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 75,31 seconds.
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Figure 463: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
89,69 seconds.
Figure 464: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TE in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
65,39 seconds.
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C.11. Constructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 465: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 15 46 100 97 118 124 69 138 201 188 228 243
# ci 485 454 400 403 382 376 431 362 299 312 272 257
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 67 222 317 322 316 295 12 63 147 172 161 140
# ci 433 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 278 183 178 184 205 488 437 353 328 339 360
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 2 16 41 55 48 52 0 0 13 13 13 24
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 498 484 459 445 452 448 500 500 487 487 487 476
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Figure 466: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 15 69 67 12 2 0 46 138 222 63 16 0
# ci 485 431 433 0 0 0 454 362 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 488 498 500 0 0 278 437 484 500
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 100 201 317 147 41 13 97 188 322 172 55 13
# ci 400 299 0 0 0 0 403 312 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 183 353 459 487 0 0 178 328 445 487
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 118 228 316 161 48 13 124 243 295 140 52 24
# ci 382 272 0 0 0 0 376 257 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 184 339 452 487 0 0 205 360 448 476
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Figure 467: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of can-
didates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 5 22 33 43 52 65 12 35 35 75 76 103
# ci 495 478 467 457 448 435 488 465 465 425 424 397
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 18 61 65 78 80 69 0 23 15 29 20 23
# ci 482 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 439 435 422 420 431 500 477 485 471 480 477
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 1 4 1 8 9 8 0 4 0 2 5 7
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 499 496 499 492 491 492 500 496 500 498 495 493
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Figure 468: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by runoff-partition of can-
didates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 5 12 0 2 5 7 22 35 61 23 4 4
# ci 495 488 0 0 0 0 478 465 0 0 0 0
# to 0 496 500 498 495 493 0 0 439 477 496 496
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 33 75 65 15 1 0 43 56 78 29 8 2
# ci 467 425 0 0 0 0 457 444 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 435 485 499 500 0 0 422 471 492 498
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 52 76 80 20 9 5 65 103 69 23 8 7
# ci 448 424 0 0 0 0 435 397 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 420 480 491 495 0 0 431 477 492 493
346
C.11.1. Computational Costs
Figure 469: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 130,91 seconds.
Figure 470: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
518,67 seconds.
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Figure 471: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
130,91 seconds.
Figure 472: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 114,84 seconds.
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Figure 473: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
514,44 seconds.
Figure 474: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
497,07 seconds.
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C.12. Destructive Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates in Model TP
Figure 475: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 276 269 275 284 274 379 422 424 463 466 474
# ci 212 224 231 225 216 226 121 78 76 37 34 26
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 414 491 490 499 499 500 177 424 441 475 486 488
# ci 86 2 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 7 10 1 1 0 312 76 59 25 14 12
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 154 316 409 431 445 450 116 267 389 398 419 421
# ci 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
# to 341 184 91 69 55 50 381 233 111 102 81 79
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Figure 476: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 288 379 414 177 154 116 276 422 491 424 316 267
# ci 212 121 86 11 5 3 224 78 2 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 312 341 381 0 0 7 76 184 233
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 269 424 490 441 409 389 275 463 499 475 431 398
# ci 231 76 0 0 0 0 225 37 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 10 59 91 111 0 0 1 25 69 102
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 284 466 499 486 445 419 274 474 500 488 450 421
# ci 216 34 0 0 0 0 226 26 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 1 14 55 81 0 0 0 12 50 79
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Figure 477: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 188 143 124 129 106 115 234 194 210 214 236 216
# ci 312 357 376 371 394 385 266 306 290 286 264 284
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 305 277 271 256 257 265 130 133 136 115 117 126
# ci 195 154 105 70 39 36 192 141 66 41 19 17
# to 0 69 124 174 204 199 178 226 298 344 364 357
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 93 94 82 85 95 84 88 106 70 86 75 67
# ci 169 122 77 28 10 4 177 106 43 25 5 3
# to 238 284 341 387 395 412 235 288 387 389 420 430
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Figure 478: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by runoff-partition of candi-
dates in model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 188 234 305 130 93 88 143 194 277 133 94 106
# ci 312 266 195 192 169 177 357 306 154 141 122 106
# to 0 0 0 178 238 235 0 0 69 226 284 288
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 124 210 271 136 82 70 129 214 256 115 85 86
# ci 376 290 105 66 77 43 371 286 7 41 28 25
# to 0 0 124 298 341 387 0 0 174 344 387 389
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 106 236 257 117 95 75 115 216 265 126 84 67
# ci 394 264 39 19 10 5 385 284 36 17 4 3
# to 0 0 204 364 395 420 0 0 199 357 412 430
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C.12.1. Computational Costs
Figure 479: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum
is 42,85 seconds.
Figure 480: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is
348,43 seconds.
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Figure 481: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 78,7
seconds.
Figure 482: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
runoff-partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum
is 78,26 seconds.
355
Figure 483: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
89,53 seconds.
Figure 484: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by runoff-
partition of candidates in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is
67,95 seconds.
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C.13. Constructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TP
Figure 485: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 68 170 206 188 193 0 94 169 229 256 248
# ci 500 432 330 0 0 0 500 406 331 5 0 0
# to 0 0 0 294 312 307 0 0 0 266 244 252
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 63 173 150 237 271 0 29 126 106 156 225
# ci 500 437 327 73 8 0 500 471 302 195 64 9
# to 0 0 0 277 277 229 0 0 72 199 280 266
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 6 64 58 103 151 0 4 22 29 62 109
# ci 500 494 401 323 179 77 500 496 429 387 306 188
# to 0 0 35 119 218 272 0 0 44 84 133 204
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Figure 486: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 94 63 29 6 4
# ci 500 500 500 500 500 500 432 406 437 471 494 496
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 170 169 173 126 64 22 206 229 150 106 58 29
# ci 330 331 327 302 401 429 0 5 73 195 323 387
# to 0 0 0 72 35 44 294 266 277 199 119 84
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 188 256 237 156 103 62 193 248 271 225 151 109
# ci 0 0 8 64 179 306 0 0 0 9 77 188
# to 312 244 255 280 218 133 307 252 229 266 272 204
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Figure 487: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 29 49 41 52 65 0 20 32 38 50 51
# ci 500 471 451 198 158 131 500 480 468 191 89 68
# to 0 0 0 261 290 304 0 0 0 271 361 381
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 18 32 26 34 48 0 9 23 18 28 33
# ci 500 482 468 266 144 59 500 491 416 335 254 140
# to 0 0 0 208 322 393 0 0 61 147 218 327
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 1 13 7 15 22 0 2 2 3 9 19
# ci 500 499 457 423 344 250 500 498 479 455 433 350
# to 0 0 3 7 141 280 0 0 19 42 58 131
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Figure 488: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for constructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 20 18 9 1 2
# ci 500 0 500 500 500 500 471 480 482 491 499 498
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 49 32 32 23 13 2 41 38 26 18 7 3
# ci 451 468 468 416 457 479 198 191 266 335 423 455
# to 0 0 0 61 3 19 261 271 208 147 7 42
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 52 50 34 28 15 9 65 51 48 33 22 19
# ci 158 89 144 254 344 433 131 68 59 140 250 350
# to 290 361 322 218 141 58 304 381 393 327 228 131
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C.13.1. Computational Costs
Figure 489: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 126,26
seconds.
Figure 490: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 329,07 seconds.
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Figure 491: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 226,68 seconds.
Figure 492: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for constructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 246,85
seconds.
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Figure 493: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of constructive control by partition
of voters in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 156,07 seconds.
Figure 494: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for constructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 149,9 seconds.
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C.14. Destructive Control by Partition of Voters in Model TP
Figure 495: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 276 273 353 334 315 308 352 410 455 464 451 442
# ci 224 227 147 0 0 0 148 90 45 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 166 185 192 0 0 0 36 49 58
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 364 482 498 488 484 473 369 492 500 493 494 490
# ci 136 18 2 0 0 0 131 8 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 12 16 27 0 0 0 7 6 10
m = 64 m = 128
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 365 500 500 497 496 497 372 499 500 498 497 498
# ci 135 0 0 0 0 0 128 1 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 3 4 3 0 0 0 2 3 2
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Figure 496: Results for plurality voting in the IC model for destructive control by partition of voters in model
TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 276 352 364 369 365 372 273 410 482 492 500 499
# ci 224 148 136 131 135 128 227 90 18 8 0 1
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 353 455 498 500 500 500 334 464 488 493 497 498
# ci 147 45 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 36 12 7 3 2
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 315 451 484 494 496 497 308 442 473 490 497 498
# ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# to 185 49 16 6 4 3 192 58 27 10 3 2
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Figure 497: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of candidates is fixed.
m = 4 m = 8
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 174 151 160 100 73 80 190 209 219 116 121 97
# ci 326 349 340 208 168 118 310 291 281 119 81 60
# to 0 0 0 192 259 302 0 0 0 265 298 343
m = 16 m = 32
n 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 222 244 273 134 127 138 241 278 273 150 125 135
# ci 278 256 227 64 41 26 259 222 92 46 20 14
# to 0 0 0 302 332 336 0 0 135 304 355 351
m = 64 m = 128
n 2 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 237 283 292 137 142 121 266 295 232 146 128 133
# ci 263 217 71 28 7 9 234 205 66 22 10 4
# to 0 0 137 335 351 370 0 0 202 332 362 363
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Figure 498: Results for plurality voting in the TM model for destructive control by partition of voters in
model TP. Number of voters is fixed.
n = 4 n = 8
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 174 190 222 241 237 266 151 209 244 278 283 295
# ci 326 310 278 259 263 234 349 291 256 222 217 205
# to 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n = 16 n = 32
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 160 219 273 273 292 232 100 116 134 150 137 146
# ci 340 281 227 92 71 66 208 119 64 46 28 22
# to 0 0 0 135 137 202 192 265 302 304 335 332
n = 64 n = 128
m 4 8 16 32 64 128 4 8 16 32 64 128
# cp 73 121 127 125 142 128 80 97 138 135 121 133
# ci 168 81 41 20 7 0 118 60 26 14 9 0
# to 259 298 332 355 351 362 302 343 336 351 370 363
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C.14.1. Computational Costs
Figure 499: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 29,37
seconds.
Figure 500: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 550,39 seconds.
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Figure 501: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in plurality elections in the IC model. The maximum is 91,41 seconds.
Figure 502: Average time the algorithm needs to find a successful control action for destructive control by
partition of voters in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 114
seconds.
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Figure 503: Average time the algorithm needs to determine no-instance of destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 289,7 seconds.
Figure 504: Average time the algorithm needs to give a definite output for destructive control by partition of
voters in model TP in plurality elections in the TM model. The maximum is 168,63 seconds.
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